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Abstract 
A growing company needs a strong strategy to ensure success and allow for growth. The 
strategies used for technological development are vital to the infrastructure and growth of a 
company, but when other competitive companies become threats, there is wide debate on the 
recommended actions of the growing company. Competing and cooperating with competitive 
companies both have pros and cons, but one must be better than the other in specific scenarios. 
This thesis is aimed at investigating what scenarios would cooperation be more beneficial and 
in what scenarios would it be better to compete. To do this, the scenarios will be modelled as a 
partially adversarial game. 
The game involves several players trying to accumulate money and Technology Points (TP). 
To do so, players will gain money each step and use that money to buy TP. To help the player 
achieve their goal, 8 strategies have been incorporated into the game: No Strategy, Higher 
Investments, Patents, Paid License, Free License, Joint Ventures, and Joint Venture Separation. 
Players will use a mix of these strategies to complete one of two motivations: economical or 
research. Conducting several tests on the game showed that using a higher investment strategy 
returns a larger money amount when only a single player is present. When multiple players 
were present, using a patent or a free license were the strategies that gave the highest winning 
rates. That patent strategy is very competitive and is commonly found in competing commercial 
technology companies. The free license strategy is very cooperative and is used commonly by 
non-profit research organisations. 
A case study done on the PC industry was used to test the validity of the simulation. 
Unfortunately, the game was unable to accurately simulate the growth of the industry to its 
current position. Further investigation into artificial intelligence, game mechanics balance, and 
company statistic conversions will be undertaken to improve accuracy
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1.0 Project Outline 
1.1 Background 
For a company or an organisation to succeed, they require strategies that will support their 
current infrastructure and allow for future growth. Most companies have a strategy management 
plan that covers all their strategies for corporate, business, and technology sectors. The 
technology strategy is the objectives, tactics, and principles relating to the use and development 
of technology within the company (Meyer, 2006). The technology used within a company and 
the development of new technologies is important to the success of a company because it affects 
both the infrastructure of the company and potential growth.  
Technological change is the first appearance of any novel product or process in a local 
production (Evenson & Westphal, 1994). To successfully implement and master new 
technology, time and money need to be invested. This can be done through cooperative research 
between interested parties, or individual research by each party separately. Both of these 
methods have their own benefits and consequences, which will be investigated during this 
project. Looking at cooperation, competition, and a combination of both, the best method for 
technological innovation will be speculated and researched.  
From a global technological development standpoint, cooperation is the ideal method for 
growth as working together allows faster research and more thorough testing. Unfortunately, 
some (if not most) business companies are more interested in the economic benefits of 
technology development. Therefore, competition is the better method as individual research 
will allow them to solely reap the economic benefits of new technologies. This, and many other 
motivating factors that drive a certain strategy will be investigated throughout this thesis. 
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1.1 Objectives 
Various studies have been conducted on the benefits and problems associated with 
competition, cooperation, or both. This thesis will investigate scenarios that provide the most 
potentially beneficial outcome for each strategy and more specifically, what scenarios would 
cooperation or competition be better as their technology strategy, with a company’s economic 
or educational motivation being the scenarios to test. To test these scenarios, a simulation has 
been created that models a partially adversarial game. The game allows for changing conditions 
that can accurately recreate the strategies found in case studies and successfully recreating these 
strategies will indicate an accurate game. 
1.2 Scope 
To help achieve the goals mentioned above, the scope of this investigation has been defined 
as follows: 
• Looking only common technology strategies such as investments, patents, 
acquisitions, paid licenses, free licenses, and joint ventures. Covert and illegal 
strategies such as insider trading or stealing ideas will not be considered. 
• Only two main motivations drive a company in terms of technology strategy: 
economical and research based. 
• Without artificial intelligence or a human opponent, the addition of a user controlled 
“main player” is not investigated in this project. The conscious thought of a human 
can’t be recreated and so an advantage would be present in a human player. 
• An accurate conversion between a company’s statistics (patent history, acquisitions, 
sales growth, etc.) and the game strategy will not be thoroughly investigated. An 
accurate conversion would require a separate investigation. Thus, a rough conversion 
will be used during the case study simulation. 
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1.3 Thesis Overview 
Chapter Two contains the background knowledge useful to helping understand the concepts 
presented in this thesis. The benefits and problems associated with competition and cooperation 
are presented with an in-depth analysis on game theory and the Nash Equilibrium. 
Chapter Three provides an analysis on the motivations present in companies that will apply 
these technology strategies. Only economic and educational motivation is investigated in this 
project and the common strategies used by companies with these motivations are presented. 
Chapter Four details the various types of technology strategy that a company could use. 
Looking at the benefits and drawbacks of each strategy, the strategies investigated are: No 
Strategy, Higher Investments, Patent, Acquisitions, Free Licensing, Paid Licensing, Joint 
Venture, and Alliance Separation. 
Chapter Five summarises a case study conducted on the personal computer industry, 
looking at the life of six established computer companies: Apple, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Acer, 
Lenovo, and Dell. A summary of strategy indicators is presented to show the types of strategies 
used by these companies. 
Chapter Six presents the game that will be used to perform the tests. The game concept is 
outlined and the mechanics of the game is presented here. This chapter also outlines how the 
simulation presents the game statistics. 
Chapter Seven details the investigation conducted with the simulation to test the variables 
within the game. The first test shows how each strategy affects the game individually, the 
second test shows how the strategies interact with each other and affect the game. The third test 
shows how each strategy compares with another in a two player game. From the data collected, 
a payoff matrix is created for the simulation in order to ascertain any Nash Equilibria.  
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Chapter Eight presents the results for the case study simulation. Hoping to recreate the 
current standings in the PC industry, the strategy analysis conducted on each company will be 
entered into the simulation. The results from the simulation will then be compared with the 
present-day standings of each company to test the validity of the simulation. 
Chapter Nine outlines the conclusions drawn from this investigation. It will answer the 
questions posed in Chapter One, relay any important information discovered during this 
investigation, and recommendations will be made for future work  
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2.0 Literature Review 
The basis of game theory involves solving problems in the presence of multiple people, each 
making their own decision (Gibbons, 1992). Within the game, each player has a motivation 
they wish to satisfy, this motivation influences the strategy undertaken by the player. Studying 
the strategies used by other players can help decide which strategy will provide the best 
outcome. The two main strategy types are cooperation and competition, with a third being a 
combination of the two. 
2.1 Strategies 
2.1.1 Cooperation 
Cooperation involves working with the other players to achieve a shared goal. Complete 
cooperation between two players causes the two to act as one entity with a greater number of 
resources, such as money or knowledge. All players in complete cooperation lose their 
individuality and share the same goals. An example of a game requiring complete cooperation 
is escaping from an escape room. A group of people are locked inside a room or series of rooms, 
competing against the clock. The players are then faced, with puzzles and clues that, when 
solved, leads to an exit. Complete cooperation is necessary for this game as everyone has a 
shared goal: escaping the room before the time runs out. Players can’t compete against each 
other in these rooms as there is only one of each puzzle and solving each puzzle helps the entire 
group. If the scenario were a group of people who each had their own individual room, then the 
game would become competitive, changing the dynamic of the escape room game. 
One of the benefits of cooperation is the ability to pool local resources such as money, 
materials, and intellect. Cooperation allows for growth or progression through support from a 
second party. An example of this would be two companies merge/one takes on the other as a 
parent company, both companies would now have shared goals and it would be possible for 
resources to be allocated from either company to wherever necessary. If one of the companies 
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needed money to research new technology for example, the other company could give them 
money and in exchange, make use of the new technology. In this instance, money is shared 
between the two companies and both receive benefits as a single entity. Rawls (1971) states 
that social cooperation makes a better life possible for all than if each were living solely on their 
own efforts. 
2.1.2 Competition 
Competition involves working against the other players to achieve an individual goal. Most 
multiplayer games are inherently competitive, especially games with only 2 players. One of the 
most renowned competitive two-person game is chess. Chess is purely competitive and 
impossible for either player to cooperate as the goal is to defeat the other player.  
In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) said “where 
competition is free, the rivalship of competitors, who are all endeavouring to justle one another 
out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his work with a certain degree 
of exactness”. This implies that a benefit of competition is that there is the constant necessity 
to do better than the opposition which consequently, improves the performance of the individual 
and the eventually, improves the industry standard. 
2.1.3 Mixed Cooperation and Competition 
Some games allow for a mix of competition and cooperation, for example, games played 
with teams or partial/limited cooperation. Games involving teams consists of multiple players 
cooperating in a competition against other groups. This type of game allows for benefits from 
both competitive and cooperative strategies. Teamwork in competitive situations allows for a 
group to collectively solve a problem whilst trying to perform better than an opposing group. 
An example of a game involving competitive teamwork is relay races: each member of a team 
runs a part of a track in succession to try and beat the other teams. It incorporates team work in 
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the sense that each team member runs a leg of the race instead of an individual running the 
entire length and it is competitive where other teams are competing to get the fastest time. 
Another more specific case of mixing cooperation and competition is limited cooperation 
that turns into competition. In this scenario, a player chooses to cooperate with another 
competitor for a certain amount of time or until a certain goal is achieved. Once this goal is 
achieved, cooperation is no longer necessary and the players may choose to return to individual 
strategies. An example of this strategy can be seen in some international sports. Most sports 
have a national league where teams compete against each other. When a team is chosen to 
represent their country, it is generally consisted of the best players in a specific role as opposed 
to the best team from that league. This means that the players that were once in competition, 
cooperate for the international game. They have a shared goal of winning for their nation and 
once they achieve this goal or the games finish, they go back to their team and go back to 
competing with each other. 
2.2 Nash Equilibrium 
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is the stable solution of a non-cooperative scenario. 
The Nash equilibrium is the solution chosen by each participant when the choices of each other 
participant have been taken into consideration. The solution is at equilibrium because the 
solution is optimised in such a way that changing from that decision provides no reward 
(Gibbons, 1992). The most common problem that demonstrates a Nash equilibrium is The 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
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2.2.1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
“Two suspects are arrested and charged with a crime. The police lack 
sufficient evidence to convict the suspects, unless at least one confesses. 
The police hold the suspects in separate cells and explain the 
consequences that will follow from the actions they could take. If 
neither confesses then both will be convicted of a minor offense and 
sentenced to one month in jail. If both confess then both will be 
sentenced to jail for six months. Finally, if one confesses but the other 
does not, then the confessor will be released immediately but the other 
will be sentenced to nine months in jail—six for the crime and a further 
three for obstructing justice.” 
(Gibbons, 1992) 
The actions in this game can be summarised into three actions and consequences: 
1. Both players deny: both will receive 1 month in jail. 
2. One confesses, one denies: the person who confessed is released and the person who 
denies receives 9 months in jail. 
3. Both confess: both receive 6 months in jail. 
This can also be represented by a matrix shown in Figure 1. 
 
Prisoner 2 
Confess Deny 
Prisoner 1 
Confess 6 , 6 0 , 9 
Deny 9 , 0 1 , 1 
Figure 1: The Prisoners' Dilemma Matrix 
The matrix shows the punishment for each prisoner depending on the response of the other 
prisoner. It can be seen that the globally optimal solution would be that both prisoners deny and 
both receive 1 month of jail time. This globally optimal solution does not consider the individual 
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choices of each prisoner. For prisoner 1, their best course of action depends on the action of the 
other prisoner. If prisoner 2 confesses, prisoner 1 would be better off confessing as denying the 
claim would result in 9 months of jail. If prisoner 2 denies the claim, the best action for prisoner 
1 would still be to confess as it would result in immediate release as opposed to 1 month in jail. 
In both hypothetical situations, prisoner 1 is better off confessing to the police. The same 
analysis can be conducted for prisoner 2 where confessing gives the optimal solution for 
themselves regardless of what prisoner 1 says. Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium is that both 
prisoners confess, and each receive 6 months of jail time. This is due to the fact that if either 
prisoner deviates from this solution, a worse punishment would result for that individual 
prisoner. 
The equilibrium solution to the prisoners’ dilemma is not the globally optimal solution due 
the personally beneficial solution chosen by each prisoner. The solution to this problem is the 
most basic demonstration of game theory where the consideration of choices made by other 
players affected the outcome. In this scenario, the globally optimal solution of both prisoners 
denying and receiving 1 month each is an unstable solution. This solution is unstable because 
there is a better solution for the other prisoner. 
This problem has a few assumptions that help determine this equilibrium point. The problem 
firstly assumes that the prisoners didn’t have any prior preparation to being caught. If the 
prisoners had organised a plan prior to getting caught, both prisoners could automatically 
default to denial without considerations of consequences. It also assumes the prisoners only 
consider their own punishment without considering the punishment of the other prisoner.  
2.2.2 The Dollar Auction Game 
The Dollar Auction Game is a game that is used in game theory to demonstrate a game 
scenario with no Nash Equilibrium. The game involves an auction to buy a one dollar bill and 
Page | 10  
 
for simplicity, two bidders. The only rule different from a normal auction is that the second 
highest bidder is required to pay their bid (Shubik, 1971).  
Letting the minimum bid and difference be 5 cents, Player A starts with 5 cents and Player 
B then bids 10 cents. Each player continues bidding as they wish to increase their gain and 
minimise their losses; if A bids 20 cents, they stand to gain 80 cents and B would lose 15 cents, 
thus B would bid higher than A to turn the loss into a gain. This would continue until the bid 
reaches 1 dollar, after this point, all players stand to make a loss but continue bidding to 
minimise the losses. If A bids 1 dollar and B then bids $1.05, A stands to lose the dollar while 
B has a net loss of only 5 cents, thus if A bids $1.10, they then only lose 10 cents whereas B 
loses $1.05. This would continue until one player gives up, but the game has a potential of being 
infinitely long as both players could theoretically continue forever. Once bidding has started, 
there is no Nash equilibrium as both players would continue to bid to minimise losses.  
The optimal solution to this situation would be that neither player participates in the game 
but that is assumed to be not a valid option. If this were possible, this solution would be unstable 
as changing from this strategy allows a player to receive a reward and once started, both players 
are trapped in the bidding war. Another assumption made during the game is the inability to 
communicate with the other bidders. Communication could lead to cooperative actions which 
defy the non-cooperative criteria of a Nash equilibrium. 
2.3 Prior Literature 
2.3.1 Competition and Cooperation by Saul Levmore (1998) 
Levmore investigated the relationship between competition and cooperation and looked at 
their dependence on firm size. Levmore also looked into the factors that contribute to a 
company’s decision to “make-or-buy”; to internally produce a part and consequently grow the 
company or source the part from a third-party producer or even the competitor. In this instance, 
he refers to cooperation as sharing or buying the same products. If two firms had prearranged a 
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deal for the part production, they were considered to be engaging in explicit cooperation 
whereas one firm simply buying from a competitor is considered implicit cooperation. 
Throughout the article, Levmore uses Ford and General Motors as examples in the automotive 
industry. 
Levmore first starts off by investigating the relationship between the size of a firm and the 
willingness to cooperate with competitors. He expected that for a given firm, if growth was 
present in the absence of increasing agency costs, the firm would internally produce necessary 
parts and thus, expanding the firm. This growth stems from the ability to control factors such 
as production rate, cost, time, and sale price as opposed to when the firm needed to buy parts 
externally. If Ford and General Motors were the only two companies producing a part, one 
company choosing to internally produce would be considered competitive as opposed to buying 
from the other and engaging in implicit cooperation. 
Levmore next looks at the influence of the market and how it affects the inclination or 
disinclination to cooperate. He anticipated that even if a part produced by a competitor was the 
most economically viable across the market, a company would not purchase that part, that is, 
not engage in implicit cooperation. An example used was that Ford would not purchase brakes 
produced by General Motors and use them in their cars. This is not always the case though as 
some cross-competition supplying has happened before: an example used by Levmore is 
Microsoft selling to Apple. 
2.3.2 International Strategic Management by Franklin Root and Kanoknart Visudtibhan 
(1992) 
Looking at Part 5: Forming International Strategic Alliances, Root and Visudtibhan look at 
the benefits of cooperation and competition. They look at the factors that decide whether to 
have a cooperative arrangement of a ‘wholly-owned operation’. They assume that projections 
have been made by a company looking into a fully-owned operation or a cooperative 
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alternative. The projections would include the profitability, costs, and revenue. They claim that 
there is a preference for a Cooperative Venture (CV) opposed to a fully-owned subsidiary when 
the difference between the incremental benefit and cost are greater than the partner’s profit 
share in that venture. Meaning cooperation is more favourable when the overall benefit or profit 
is greater than the partner’s. 
Root and Visudtibhan go on to list the direct and indirect benefits of a cooperative venture 
shown in Figure 2 and the costs that decrease with a cooperative venture shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 2: Direct and indirect benefits from a CV 
 
Figure 3: Direct and indirect cost decreases due to a CV 
They then investigate the ‘costs’ of cooperative ventures, looking at the possible detrimental 
effects of cooperation as opposed to a fully-owned investment. They speculate that a firm can 
be potentially constrained by its CV as it may not have the freedom to undertake investments 
in a new line of business. There is also a possibility that prices for end-products that were set 
during the collaboration are lower than they would prefer. Figure 4 lists the possible detrimental 
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effects of a cooperative venture and Figure 5 lists the cost increases due to a cooperative 
venture. 
 
Figure 4: Possible detrimental effects from a CV 
 
Figure 5: Cost increase due to a CV 
Lastly, Root and Visudtibhan talk about the role of technology in the formation of 
cooperative arrangements. They conclude that firms with similar interests in research and 
development are more likely to cooperate. This willingness to cooperate is due to the escalating 
speed of technological innovation, as well as increasing numbers of technologically advanced 
competitors. 
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3.0 Strategy Motivation 
Before implementing any strategy into a business, the goals and motivations of a company 
need to be assessed to determine what strategies will be most effective for the specific company. 
Economic and research are examples of motivation or goals that a company can undertake and 
will be investigated in this project. 
3.1 Economic Motivation 
Economic motivation is one that drives almost all multi-person party or company. Though 
it may not be an important factor for some companies, such as ones that don’t sell any products, 
there would still be an underlying economic motivation. 
Everything in the modern world requires money, including food, transport costs, and 
electricity in the electronic devices used by almost every person in a first world city. Companies 
cannot be managed and operated by a single person, so workers are required. Since workers 
need money to live, the company needs money to pay for workers. Most companies sell 
products to gain money, of which, includes the wages of its workers and profit for the owners. 
This is the most conventional business model and largely supports the economic motivation.  
Some research companies such as ECRI Institute are non-profit organisations that are 
dedicated to research (ECRI Institute, 2017). These types of companies don’t have a goal of 
earning money, but the research conducted by these companies and the wage of the workers 
require money, generally obtained through donations and research grants. Without money, the 
company would not be able to survive and hence, money is generally an underlying motivation 
in all companies. 
A company with economic motivation would be more likely to compete with other 
companies as competition within a common market results in reduced sales and consequently, 
reduced profit. Since money is an important goal, cooperation would mean profits are shared 
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with a different company and so, it would be more beneficial to compete alone and not share 
the profits. 
3.2 Research Goals 
A company with a research goal is one aimed at conducting experiments or inventing new 
methods, processes, or devices in hopes of improving the quality of life on Earth. SpaceX is an 
example of a company dedicated to research without economic motivation. SpaceX has 
designed a reusable rocket in the hopes of reducing the cost of space access by a hundredfold 
(SpaceX, 2017). Comparing SpaceX to Virgin Galactic, a company with the goal of “creating 
something new and lasting: the world’s first commercial spaceline” (Virgin Galactic, 2017), it 
can be seen that Virgin Galactic are conducting research in order to produce a commercial 
service, aimed at earning money. 
A company with a research orientated goal is more likely to cooperate with other companies 
as the end goal is something they will share with others and the world. There is no point in them 
competing and initiating conflict when cooperation will help them reach their goal. 
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4.0 Technology Strategies 
To help improve the sales, growth, and infrastructure of a company, various strategies can 
be implemented, each with their own unique benefits and consequences. 
4.1 No Investment/Strategy 
This strategy, or lack thereof, is one that is found inherently in all companies and has both 
positive and negative effects. Using no strategy (NS) involves basing the technology 
change/upgrade on industry technological growth. This is analogous to a company buying the 
latest machine or software to use but makes no investment into expanding the technology 
internally. The technology of the company grows with the industry but if other companies are 
relying on this strategy than everyone advances at the same pace. This strategy has no extra 
benefit to the company but it also doesn’t cause conflict between competitors. 
4.2 Higher Investments 
A higher investment (HI) strategy is generally used when a company has encountered a 
setback or is struggling to complete a project. Investing more time and money into a project 
does not have a linear relationship with innovation (Hottenrott & Peters, 2009). An exact 
relationship has not been determined between investment and innovation but as an example: if 
we rate a product’s innovation out of 10, an investment of $1 million produced an product with 
an innovation level of 5, an investment of $2 million in the same project would only have an 
innovation level of 8. Putting all of a company’s money into a project is only something they 
would do as a backup plan for a quick but expensive investment. 
4.3 Patent 
A patent (PA) is a protection system for new methods, processes, substances, or inventions, 
giving legally enforced rights to the patented object and its owner (Australian Government, 
2016). A patent prevents others from using, selling, and/or manufacturing the intellectual 
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property (IP) without the owner’s permission. When a patent has been successfully granted, the 
development of rival inventors/companies is affected significantly and if the patent is 
effectively protected, it will provide a competitive advantage to the owner (Ernst, 2003).  
In Managing Intellectual Capital, Grindley and Teece (1997) stated that within the 
semiconductor industry, industry participants found it increasingly necessary to seek licensing 
due to patent protection. This means that the participant must either pay royalties to the IP 
owner or develop their own invention, both of which negatively affect the growth of the 
participant. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the competitive nature of the patent and the negative 
effects on the competition stimulates innovation as the competition must find new approaches 
to the problem, in fear of money or job loss. 
The patent is beneficial to a company with a very competitive goal such as an economic 
motivation. It allows for control of the market but at a high cost, required for obtaining and 
maintain a patent. 
4.4 Acquisition 
An acquisition (AQ) is when a company (acquirer) wishes to gain control of another 
company (target) in either a merger or hostile takeover (Investopedia, 2017). A merger is a 
cooperative acquisition where both parties expect positive outcomes from the merger. For 
example, a more financially secure company can acquire a small company in debt to take on 
the debt while the small company provides the acquirer with profits over time. A hostile 
takeover is more aggressive and undesired by the target company. To perform a hostile 
takeover, the acquiring company will try and purchase the target company by placing an offer 
to the shareholders to gain control of the target. Once a takeover has been successfully 
completed, the target becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer, to either increase sales/profit of the 
acquirer or to just remove a competitor in the industry.  
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An example of a hostile acquisition is the Vodafone – Mannesmann takeover in 1999 
(Deutsche Welle, 2010) between two of the largest telecommunications companies in Europe. 
In November 1999, U.K based Vodafone presented an offer of approximately 100 billion euros 
to the Mannesmann CEO, Klaus Esser. Esser refused the offer which led to Vodafone CEO 
Chris Ghent to repeated increase his offer, which was declined by Esser each time, eventually 
leading Ghent to approaching Mannesman shareholders directly. After Vodafone announced 
mergers with various other companies, investors and shareholders in Mannesmann began 
urging Esser to accept the deal by Ghent. In February 2000, the takeover was approved by the 
Mannesmann supervisory board in a 190 billion euro deal, the largest takeover bid at the time 
(Deutsche Welle, 2010). Today, Mannesmann is non-existent in the telecommunications 
industry whereas Vodafone is ranked 19th in the global telecommunications industry by Forbes 
(2017). 
An acquisition would more likely be done by a competitive company looking to dominate a 
market, by removing the competition and gaining all the potential profit/clients and resources 
owned by the target company. A takeover is beneficial to a company by removing the 
competition but at a very high cost, one that may not be returned in sales. 
4.5 Licensing 
In technology strategy, licensing is the agreement or contract regarding the conditions 
permitted to the user for an IP made by the owner. In this investigation, two forms of licensing 
will be investigated, paid licensing and free licensing. 
4.5.1 Free Licensing 
By giving free license of IP, a company offers unrestricted use of the product to anyone for 
free. Although the company does not gain any direct profit, they do grow in terms of 
technological development due to feedback from the licensee (Kolk et al., 2015). Due to the 
product being free, the number of licenses distributed is quite high and consequently, allows 
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for fast growth. It is beneficial to cooperative companies with a research oriented goal due to 
the wide range of feedback given by product users. Such strategy is not commonly used by 
competitive companies as they receive little to no return from investing in a strategy. 
4.5.2 Paid Licensing 
Similarly, paid licensing provides technological development through licensee feedback, but 
it also provides an income for the IP owner. As licensees must pay for the product, the paid 
license will generally have less sales than a free license. Irrespective of the price, paid licenses 
have shown to be very effective in the growth of a company. Using the example of Microsoft: 
Bill Gates and Paul Allen developed MS-DOS, an operating system for the IBM-PC (Swaine 
& Freiberger, 2014). The operating system that they built required a paid license, paid by the 
computer hardware manufacturer and given to the consumer preinstalled in the computer, 
meaning the consumer essentially purchased a license from the manufacturer. Microsoft 
convinced IBM of two things, to allow the operating system to have an “open architecture” 
(allowing programmers to develop programs freely for the operating system) and allow 
Microsoft to distribute the operating system to other PC companies. The open architecture was 
one of the main success factors in the IBM-PC and consequently, higher sales in IBM-PC’s 
meant more royalties to Microsoft. Being able to distribute their product to other companies as 
well, Microsoft now have the largest user base for the Windows Operating System. 
Paid licensing is a mixture of both cooperative and competitive strategies. It allows anyone 
to use the product but also provides income for the company. This is beneficial to all types of 
companies as it allows for both economic and technological growth but there is a risk of 
imitation when allowing potential competitors to have access to licensed products. 
4.6 Joint Venture Formation 
Similar to a merger, a joint venture (JV) involves two parties that form an alliance as separate 
entities. The joint venture allows both parties to cooperate, sharing resources, knowledge, and 
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risks (Investopedia, 2017). A joint venture is purely cooperative as both parties must be willing 
to participate and share resources. An example of a joint venture is the Sony and Ericsson joint 
venture. Forming Sony Ericsson, the joint venture climaxed in 2012 as the 9th highest 
worldwide mobile phone vendor. 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, for competing parties, a joint venture is beneficial when there 
is greater overall benefits than the partner’s. another case in which a joint venture would be 
beneficial would be when more than two companies are competing in the same market, if one 
is significantly greater than the others, the smaller companies would benefit from a joint venture 
against the larger company. In certain cases, a joint venture may not be beneficial, this could 
be when the logistical costs of a joint venture are large, and the market sales may not produce 
an adequate return. 
A joint venture is also a good way for a company to get a foothold in a foreign country. 
Instead of spending exorbitant amounts of time and resources on marketing in a foreign country, 
a company will generally have a better reception with a partner already in that market (Agarwal 
& Ramaswami, 1991). 
4.7 Joint Venture Separation 
The timing for a joint venture separation is also something to be considered when applying 
a technology strategy. A joint venture is based on either a mutual or contractual agreement, 
both of which can provide some benefit to a company if they decide to end the agreement.  
If the joint venture is based on a mutual agreement, for example, two store owners agree to 
only sell on separate street. If one owner decides to separate from the joint venture and sell on 
the other’s street, the second owner has lost some profit while the first person gains an 
advantage. Similarly, if a competitive company decides to leave a merger, it will do so in a way 
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that is most beneficial for itself: make preparations without informing the partner, allowing the 
competing company to be ready for the separation and the partner in shock. 
Contractually based joint ventures are more complex and both companies are legally 
required to fulfil the contract before leaving. Once separation has been agreed, the contract 
should define how the profits and resources are divided between each company. This allows 
both companies to have reassurance about their profits and resources. 
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5.0 Case Study – PC Industry 
To validate the feasibility of using a game to simulate the growth of a company, a case study 
on the PC industry has been conducted. The findings from this case study will be implemented 
into the simulation to compare the game results with the present-day standings of each 
company. Six companies; Apple, Hewlett-Packard (HP), International Business Machines 
(IBM), Acer, Lenovo, and Dell, will be investigated and their strategy analysis will be 
implemented into the simulation. 
5.1 History 
The 1900’s saw the start on an electronic revolution. Companies designing and producing 
electrical components such as semiconductors and transistors were becoming increasingly 
common and the prices of these components were decreasing drastically. Before the PC, 
computers were machines about the size of a room, costed hundreds of thousands of dollars 
(Swaine & Freiberger, 2014) and was generally only purchased by research laboratories and 
governments. The first “PC” is said to be made by a company called Micro Instrumentation 
Telemetry Systems (MITS). MITS developed the Altair 8800 in 1974, shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: MITS Altair 8800 Computer (Swaine & Freiberger, 2014)  
The Altair 8800 was a personal computer but very different to the contemporary computers. 
It was a personal computer in the sense that the price was low enough that a working-class 
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citizen could afford one, but comprised of only an integrated circuit board, lights, and switches. 
It came as a kit that hobbyists could build themselves and included minimal features. The more 
conventional computer would  soon to emerge. 
5.2 Apple 
5.2.1 History 
After the release of the Altair 8800, many companies and entrepreneurs began building and 
selling similar computer kits, The Apple-I being one of them. Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak 
founded Apple from their garage with an investment from Ron Wayne. Similarly to the Altair 
8800, the Apple-I did not include a monitor, keyboard, or mouse but it did come fully assembled 
which was quite appealing to potential customers that did not have the technical knowledge to 
build their own computer from parts. It was also cheaper than the Altair whilst only slightly 
reducing the capabilities. The Apple-I computer was still more aimed at hobbyist that had the 
technical knowledge to build and use a computer rather than an average consumer. The Apple-
II changed that by introducing an “all-in-one” design that incorporated a color screen and 
keyboard (Swaine & Freiberger, 2014). This computer could be seen as the first real commercial 
personal computer for all consumers.  
5.2.2 Strategy Indicators 
The Apple-II ran a version of Beginner’s All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code or BASIC 
(Dartmouth College, 1964), an easily accessible, free licensed code that allowed hobbyists to 
write their own software. In 1979, VisiCalc (Visible Calculations) was created on an Apple-II 
and was an instant success (Swaine & Freiberger, 2014). Personal computers had previously 
been for hobbyists and software designers and didn’t have any practical use for normal 
consumers. VisiCalc changed that by bringing a business standard software to an affordable 
personal computer. As it was only available on Apple-II in its first year, the high demand for 
this program increased sales in the Apple-II. 
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Apple felt the need to build a new and improved machine as the hype of the Apple-II began 
to decline. Apple went public in 1980 to support the research and marketing costs (Swaine & 
Freiberger, 2014). In 1991, Apple CEO John Sculley presented an operating system that was 
compatible with an IBM-PC to IBM. Impressed with the display, Apple, IBM, and Motorola 
(Forming AIM) begin “collaborating” (Swaine & Freiberger, 2014) to design a new generation 
of computers. After several months, the joint venture with IBM was failing and had caused a 
loss of $300 million which led Apple to separate from the AIM alliance (Swaine & Freiberger, 
2014). 
Apple acquired NeXT Inc., a computer company owned by the Apple founder Steve Jobs 
(Swaine & Freiberger, 2014). Apple used the technology developed by NeXT in its next line of 
computers. To date, apple have acquired at least 90 technologies or companies with possibly 
more undocumented acquisitions (Crunchbase, 2017). In 2016, Apple Inc, had the 11th highest 
number of patents granted, a total of 2102 (IFI Claims Patent Servies, 2016) 
5.2.3 Current Standings 
From the first Apple computer, Apple have released various other computer models and is 
still producing new models today. Apple is currently the most valuable company in all of history 
with a market cap of $752 Billion (Forbes, 2017). Although Apple has the highest market cap, 
in the PC industry, Apple’s market share is approximately 6.9% (currently 4th) as of the second 
quarter of 2017 (Gartner, 2017). 
5.3 Hewlett-Packard 
5.3.1 History 
Hewlett-Packard was founded in 1939 by two friends, Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard. Both 
had been working together to make audio oscillators for Walt Disney (Hewlett-Packard, 2017). 
Oscillators were HP’s main product until 1972 when they introduced the HP-35 Calculator. 
This calculator and following calculator models became the main product of the company until 
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1980 when HP released their first computer: the HP-85. Given the established foundation of the 
company, the HP-85 had reliable sales but not nearly as much as the Apple-II (Swaine & 
Freiberger, 2014).  
5.3.2 Strategy Indicators 
In 1963, HP forms its first joint venture with Yokogawa, forming Yokogawa-Hewlett-
Packard (YHP) (Hewlett-Packard, 2017). In 2001, HP announces an agreement with Compaq 
to merge into a “gloabal technology leader” (Hewlett-Packard, 2017). To date, HP have made 
157 acquisitions (Hewlett-Packard Alumni Association, 2017). In 2016, HP were granted 594 
patents (IFI Claims Patent Servies, 2016). 
5.3.3 Current Standings 
HP is currently the top seller of PC’s worldwide (Gartner, 2017) with a market cap of $29.4 
Bn (Forbes, 2017). 
5.4 International Business Machines 
5.4.1 History 
International Business Machines is a company that began in 1911 as the “Computing-
Tabulating-Recording Company” and sold machinery such as industrial time recorders, 
tabulators, and punched cards (International Business Machines, 2017). After entering the 
calculator market in 1944, IBM designed its first large computer: the IBM 701, a mainframe 
computer used mainly by governments and research laboratories due to its cost and size. Being 
such a large company with solid financial and technological foundation, IBM became one of 
the most recognised companies to produce mainframe computers and the slightly smaller, 
“fridge-sized” minicomputers. The personal computer industry was still niche until IBM 
released their first PC, the “IBM-PC”. When IBM introduced their PC, they legitimized the 
industry as they were seen as an established technological leader (Swaine & Freiberger, 2014). 
Something that gave IBM an edge was the use of the open operating system initially developed 
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by Microsoft. This allowed software developers to create programs compatible with the IBM 
computers, something IBM hadn’t done before and Apple weren’t doing at the time. The open 
system provided both an advantage and disadvantage; it meant that software was readily being 
developed for the IBM-PC but left it vulnerable to imitations. This is what happened when 
Compaq Computer built a 100 percent IBM-compatible computer. Being compatible and 
cheaper, IBM sales were adversely affected. Soon many other companies would produce an 
IBM-compatible machine, leaving only the IBM brand as the standout between the machines. 
As cost started to become a more important selling point than specifications, IBM sales begin 
to dwindle. In 1992, IBM introduce the industry’s first notebook, the IBM ThinkPad. After 
successful sales and innovative upgrades, the ThinkPad became the first notebook to be certified 
by the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (Lenovo, 2017). In 2004, IBM announce an 
agreement to sell the IBM Personal Computing Division to Lenovo.  
5.4.2 Strategy Indicators 
The inception of IBM was through an acquisition, the computer, tabulating, and recording 
company was the merger of 3 companies: International Time Recording Company, Tabulating 
Machine Company, and Computing Scale Company (International Business Machines, 2017). 
To date, IBM have acquired at least 176 companies or technologies (Crunchbase, 2017). 
Originally, IBM had closed source software, meaning if people were to buy an IBM 
computer, they had to purchase IBM built software and couldn’t develop their own. When IBM 
released the IBM-PC, they used a Microsoft operating system called PC-DOS (Swaine & 
Freiberger, 2014). Microsoft founder, Bill Gates, convinced IBM to license the operating 
system and allow software developers to build software for their PC’s. This is one of the major 
contributors to the success of the IBM-PC. IBM later formed a joint venture with Apple and 
Motorola to form the AIM alliance. This objective of this collaboration was to produce the next 
generation of computers.  
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In 2016, IBM were granted 8088 patents, making them the highest patent assignee of the 
year (IFI Claims Patent Servies, 2016). 
5.4.3 Current Standings 
IBM is non-existent in the PC industry today, with a market cap of $162.4 Bn (Forbes, 2017), 
it is not in the top 6 vendors of PC’s by market share (Gartner, 2017). 
5.5 Acer 
5.5.1 History 
Acer was founded in 1976 in Taiwan as Multitech. Initially the company dealt mainly in 
processors but quickly joined the IBM-PC compatible market in 1981 (Acer Inc., 2017). 
5.5.2 Strategy Indicators 
In 2007, Acer announced the acquisition of Gateway Inc, a strong U.S. based computer 
company, for $710 million (IDG News Service, 2007). Acer have made 13 other major 
acquisitions in its lifetime. In 2016, Acer was granted 109 patents (IFI Claims Patent Servies, 
2016). In 2017, Acer and Starbreeze have announced a joint venture in the virtual reality market 
(Starbreeze, 2017). 
5.5.3 Current Standings 
Acer, with a market cap of $49.53Bn (Google, 2017), is now a household name when it 
comes to computers and laptops and is currently sitting sixth in the global market share 
(Gartner, 2017). 
5.6 Lenovo 
5.6.1 History 
Founded in 1984 in China as Legend, Lenovo didn’t begin to produce computers until 1990 
when it released the Legend PC (Lenovo, 2017). In 2004, Lenovo acquired IBM’s Personal 
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Computing Division, gaining the rights to the ThinkPad notebook and ThinkCentre Desktop 
PC.  
5.6.2 Strategy Indicators 
Lenovo’s acquisition of the IBM ThinkPad and ThinkCentre was the crux in the company’s 
sales. IBM were losing money and increasing debt fast, unable to keep a strong foothold in 
foreign markets, IBM PC sales were dwindling. Lenovo purchased the IBM PC division for 
$1.25Bn (Forbes, 2017). Lenovo (ranked 9th in the industry at the time) utilised their foothold 
in the Chinese market and the established branding of the ThinkPad and ThinkCentre series by 
IBM contributed to the global industry leader it is today. Purchasing the ThinkPad and 
ThinkCentre were not enough to account for the success of the company. Once acquired, 
Lenovo invested money and time to bring new innovations to the already advanced computer 
range (Lenovo, 2017). 
In 2011, Lenovo and NEC Corporation announce a joint venture to form the largest PC 
vendor in the Japanese market (Lenovo, 2011). In 2016, Lenovo were granted 200 patents (IFI 
Claims Patent Servies, 2016). 
5.6.3 Current Standings 
Continuing to push the sales of the ThinkPad and ThinkCentre, Lenovo would become the 
#1 PC vendor worldwide in 2013 until 2017 (Gartner, 2017) where HP would overtake Lenovo 
in sales, leaving it in 2nd place. As of 2017, Lenovo has a market cap of $51.10bn (Forbes, 
2017). 
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5.7 Dell 
5.7.1 History 
Like Apple, Dell was founded by Michael Dell in his garage in 1984. Dell focused on 
personal computers until 2003 when it began expanding into printers and home entertainment 
(Fell, 2017). 
5.7.2 Strategy Indicators 
In 2006, Dell acquired Alienware, a top of the line gaming PC manufacturer (Hachman, 
2006). At the time, Alienware were a small company that built high-end gaming computers. 
The combination of innovation from Alienware and Dell’s global connections brought 
prosperity to both brands. From its inception, Dell have acquired about 32 other companies or 
technologies (Crunchbase, 2017). In 2015, Dell announced a joint venture with Chinese vendor 
and service provider, Kingsoft (Judge, 2015). In 2016, Dell were granted 486 patents (IFI 
Claims Patent Servies, 2016). 
5.7.3 Current Standing 
 Dell is currently the 3rd highest selling PC vendor (Gartner, 2017) with a market cap of 
$13.5 Bn (Forbes, 2017). 
6.0 Game Simulation 
To simulate the technology, a partially adversarial game has been constructed in Python. 
6.1 Game Concept 
The game involves between 2 to 6 players competing to earn a certain number of Tech Points 
(TP). In each step of the game, each player is given some money depending on how much TP 
they have. This is representative of the regular profit a company would receive from some 
product, where a higher level of technology allows for higher profits. After a certain time 
interval, each player has the potential upgrade(increase their TP) at the cost of money. The cost 
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of each upgrade increases with respect to the amount of TP they have accumulated. This is to 
represent the increasingly difficult task of improving or inventing new technology, both of 
which require more resources than previously (Rogers, 1983).  
To end the game, a player will need to reach a certain number of TP, the tech cap. Once this 
is achieved, a post-game analysis will summarise the results to see if the player achieved their 
goal. The Python code for the simulation can be found in Appendix 11.1 
6.2 Game Mechanics 
The mechanics behind each component of the game is described below, a detailed user guide 
can be found in Appendix 11.2. 
6.2.1 Game Start-up 
To begin the simulation, the user chooses the number of players present in the game, the 
Tech Cap, and whether to run the default settings or custom settings. Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Opening text for the simulation using default settings 
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The default settings are pre-set strategies and starting times for each player. The starting time 
is the point at which a company enters the market. If the user wishes to enter custom setting, 
they are able to set the starting time and strategy for each player. The strategies that a player 
can implement are: No Strategy (NS), Higher Investments (HI), Patent (PA), Acquisition (AQ), 
Free Licensing (FL), Paid Licensing (PL), Joint Venture (JV), and Joint Venture Separation 
(JVS). 
6.2.2 Choosing a Strategy 
During each turn, if the player is not currently implementing a strategy, they are able to 
choose a strategy. Since a “choice” made by the simulation would require artificial intelligence, 
the choosing mechanism is based on probability. The strategy mechanism is set in the form: 
[HI, PA, AQ, PL, FL, JV], where each strategy is given a number value. Since the choice replies 
on probability, the sum of these strategies must not exceed 100. NS and JVS were not included 
in the strategy choice as NS is the default strategy if none of these are chosen, and JVS requires 
the player to be in an alliance first. Since JVS is the probability that the player will want to 
leave the alliance, it can be set as the inverse of the JV attribute, where a player that has a high 
preference of forming an alliance would have a lower chance of breaking the alliance. 
Using the form above, the choices made by a player of certain motivation can be simulated 
with high degree of accuracy. For example, if a competitive player with strong economical 
motivation was to be modelled, it could have a potential strategy of [10, 20, 20, 5, 10, 0]. This 
shows a strong affinity to creating a patent and wanting an acquisition whereas it would have a 
low probability of giving out a free license or forming a joint venture. A strategy is chosen at 
random and the player will generally continue to use this strategy for a certain number of turns 
depending on the situation. 
During each turn, the order in which the players decide their strategy is randomised as to not 
allow for any player to have an advantage of acting first each turn. 
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6.2.3 No Strategy 
The default strategy for each player is to not do anything significant other than continue 
gaining profit until they can increase their TP. While the player is implementing this strategy, 
they are able to choose a new one unless if it too soon after a previous strategy. If a player does 
not have enough money to implement a certain strategy, they will default back to NS 
6.2.4 Higher Investments 
If a player chooses to implement the HI strategy, they are choosing to pay significantly more 
money for an instantaneous increase in TP. This is analogous to a company spending more 
funding to complete more research faster. Within the game, the player would gain 1 TP at a 
higher price instantaneously. 
6.2.5 Patent Application 
Assuming all players are a part of the same industry, a patent would negatively affect all 
other players, causing them to spend resources on modifying their product to satisfy the patent 
law. In the game, for a very high cost, a patent will cause the other players to lose half of their 
current TP. Once a patent has been used by a player, that player cannot file for another patent 
for 30 steps.  
6.2.6 Acquisitions 
An acquisition can be a very resource consuming strategy, but can provide good benefits if 
completed successfully. To buy a company, the acquirer must be able to pay an offer of: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑄 =  𝑀𝑇 + 2 ∗ 𝑇𝑇                                                     (1) 
Where CostAQ is the cost of the hostile takeover to the acquirer and, MT and TT is the money 
and TP owned by the target respectively. This means that a company with more resources and 
technology would be move expensive to takeover. If the acquirer is successful, the target gains 
the CostAQ directly and loses all of its TP, the acquirer loses the takeover cost but gains half of 
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the TP owned by the target. The acquirer doesn’t get the full amount of TP from the target to 
account for factors such as technology cross-over (same tech in a acquiring company), tech 
incompatibility, and logistic losses in data. Once acquired, the target is left with money and no 
TP, it can stay like that for the rest of the game or choose to try and attempt a takeover if it has 
adequate funding. The acquirer will revert back to NS for 30 steps before being able to use 
another strategy. 
6.2.7 Free Licensing 
When a player implements a free license, they are giving open access to their product in 
hopes of useful feedback to increase their TP. For 10 steps, the player will lose some portion of 
money each turn but during the tech upgrade interval, they will gain 4 TP. 
6.2.8 Paid Licensing 
For the paid licensing strategy, the player gains some portion of money each turn but due to 
lower amount of sales than the FL, less feedback is given and they only gain 2 TP. 
6.2.9 Joint Venture 
When a player chooses to initiate a joint venture, the initiating player must first choose who 
to form an alliance with. To choose a partner, the initiating player takes into account the TP and 
money of all the players. A higher TP and more money give the player a higher probability of 
being chosen as a partner. The choice is once again randomised with ideal candidates having a 
higher probability of being chosen. 
Once the partner has been chosen, the alliance is still not guaranteed. The partnership must 
be a mutual agreement, so the JV attribute of the potential partner affects the probability of the 
joint venture. Using probability principles, if both player were to have a 50% chance of wanting 
an alliance, there is a 25% chance that both agree to an alliance. This principle will determine 
the probability of a successful alliance formation, where two high JV probable player are 
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significantly more likely to accomplish an alliance as opposed to two competitive (low JV) 
players. 
Once the joint venture has been approved, the two companies merge and become a new 
entity, acting as one company and using shared resources. The alliance becomes a new player 
entirely, leaving the constituent players without TP or money. The resources available to the 
alliance is 80% of the combined TP from both companies and 70% of the combined money 
from both companies. The loss of TP is due to similar reasons as the loss during a hostile 
takeover. There is higher TP retention rate though as both players are willing to share TP. The 
loss of money is due to the cost of merging into one company, such as legal fees or logistical 
costs. The alliance uses the average of the constituent players’ strategy, creating its own unique 
strategy, representative of the input from two companies where one player with an inclination 
towards HI can persuade the other to do so as well. 
If one of the players is already in an alliance, then the same process is applied. There is still 
a chance of not successfully joining the alliance but once it is approved, the player adds all of 
their TP and money to the alliance, and incorporates their strategy. 
6.2.10 Alliance Separation 
The players that are in an alliance have no TP or money. They do not implement any strategy 
but while in an alliance, each player has the potential to leave at any point. The probability of 
leaving is dependent on their initial JV attribute. A player with a high JV attribute is less likely 
to leave an alliance opposed to a player with a low JV attribute. The JV attribute alone is not 
enough to simulate the probability of leaving an alliance. Once in an alliance, it is very unlikely 
that a player will want to leave, due to more losses in money and TP. To account for this, the 
probability of wanting to leave an alliance is reduced by a factor of 10. 
If a player has chosen to separate from the alliance, they will return to being a single player 
with their unique strategy. If the JV only consisted of two players, the alliance will be dissolved 
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completely, and the resources and TP will be split amongst the players. The share of the 
resources that each player gets is dependent on their initial contribution to the alliance. If the 
alliance has more than two players, the share of the leaving player is deducted from the TP and 
money and the strategy is adjusted for the two remaining players. 
6.3 Post Game Results 
The game will run until a player has reached the Tech Cap, once the Tech Cap has been 
reached, the game will report the end game analysis. The analysis for each game shows the final 
TP and money for each player. The post-simulation analysis will show the average final TP, the 
highest money amount (HMA) earnt during the simulation, and the average total money earnt 
(AME) during the game for each player. This allows analysis of which player consistently had 
the highest TP, money, and total money earnt during the simulation. The average steps taken 
(AST) for the simulation is also recorded to assess the research motivation. 
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7.0 Simulation Experiments 
To test the simulation, the effects of each strategy will be investigated in various scenarios.  
7.1 Test 1 – Isolation Test 
The isolation test involves assessing each strategy alone, seeing how each one will affect 
various parameters. The game was run with only 1 player and a single strategy with a goal of 
reaching a TP of 15. The test was repeated 100 times and the AST, HMA, and AME were found. 
The average money earnt per step was also found to compare between strategies. Table 1 shows 
the results from the test. 
Table 1: Isolation Test Results 
 
Probability 
(%) 
Average 
Steps Taken 
(steps) 
Highest 
Money 
Amount ($) 
Average Total 
Money Earnt 
($) 
Average Money 
Earnt per 
Step($/step) 
No Strategy 100 190 90.2 314.2 1.653 
Higher 
Investment 
25 203.4 74.6 356.1 1.7507 
50 207.81 69.2 366.256 1.7624 
75 208.98 65.6 370.284 1.7718 
Free 
Licensing 
10 87 77.2 135.48 1.5572 
30 76.6 79.82 112.48 1.4684 
50 73.6 79.82 108.16 1.4695 
Paid 
Licensing 
10 132.7 78.28 216.52 1.6316 
30 124.4 79.24 202.84 1.6305 
50 119.5 79.68 191.56 1.6030 
 
Using NS as the control strategy, clear trends can be seen in the data that replicate the 
strategies.  
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7.1.1 Higher Investment Analysis 
It can be seen for HI, as the probability of using the HI strategy increases, the average number 
of steps taken to complete a simulation increases. This is expected as the cost of an instant 
investment is higher than normal, if a company uses that strategy, they will inevitably increase 
the total amount of money needed to fulfil the objective. This is demonstrated in the increasing 
total money earnt for the HI test. It can also be seen that on average, the HI strategy provided 
more money to the player each step. 
7.1.2 Free Licensing Analysis 
 For the free licensing, a clear relationship between the strategy preference to use a free 
license. The increasing probability of FL causes a significant reduction in the average steps and 
money earnt. This is expected as a Free License allows everyone to develop software and 
products and offer feedback, allowing for faster tech upgrades. The disadvantage of using the 
FL strategy is that it costs money to do so.  
7.1.3 Paid License Analysis 
For the PL simulations, once again there is a decrease in AST and AME as expected but the 
average values for both of these are higher than the average for the FL attribute. This is due to 
the lower amount of TP received when using a paid license which increases the number of steps 
required to complete a simulation. The higher AME is due to the strategy including an income 
source for the player which reduces the overall money losses. 
7.1.4 Analysis Summary 
This test shows that the simulation can represent the benefits and setbacks of each strategy 
accurately. For an economic motivation, a higher investment strategy provides the most money 
for a player in total and per step. For a research based motivation, the free license reaches Tech 
Cap the fastest. 
Page | 38  
 
7.2 Test 2 – Combination Test 
The combination test had only one player but aims at investigating how the results are 
affected with a second strategy implemented (not including the No Strategy tactic). The results 
for this test are presented in Table 2 with data in the form of Average Steps Taken|Highest 
Money Amount|Average Money Earnt. 
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Table 2: Effects of Strategy Pairs 
 
 
 
HI Probability 
 
PA Probability 
 
POS Probability 
25 50 5 15 10 50 
AST (steps) 
HMA 
($) 
AME ($) AST (steps) 
HMA 
($) 
AME ($) AST (steps) 
HMA 
($) 
AME ($) AST (steps 
HMA 
($) 
AME ($) AST (steps) 
HMA 
($) 
AME ($) AST (steps) 
HMA 
($) 
AME 
($) 
PA Probability 
5 216 79.9 376.244 216.94 71.95 375.48 
 
15 225.52 79.45 397.51 224.24 76.85 392.19 
 
POS Probability 
10 170.22 93.49 282.27 189.32 92.79 317.59 
 
145.4 80.32 242.52 164.6 79.2 283.52 
 
50 136.83 83.7 222.66 147.8 91.29 242.6 124.7 79.72 203.54 131.8 78.88 218.52 
 
FOS Probability 
10 138.96 79.8 226.12 138.99 85.2 224.46 
 
97.8| 75.94 158.88 122.7 77.88 216.52 
 
98.1 79.56 156.98 109.6 79.24 174.82 
50 100.63 84.16 157.31 112.56 84.32 176.29 76.2| 79.58 111.46 86.4 79.7 134.56 82.3 79.82 129.08 83.7 78.5 130.96 
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This test does not include NS, AQ, or JV because NS is a default strategy that was present 
in Test 1, and AQ and JV are both multiplayer attributes that only affect other players. Several 
important deductions can be made from the data recorded in this test. 
7.2.1 Higher Investment Analysis 
Firstly, looking at the HI strategy, when coupled with a patent, the average amount of money 
earnt each game and the average steps taken were among the highest in the test. This outcome 
was expected due to the results from test 1, where a higher patent probability increased the 
average steps taken and the average money earnt.  
When coupled with a paid license, the higher PL attribute reduced the AST significantly, but 
also reduced the AME. When the free licence was used with the HI strategy, the average steps 
taken were minimal for the HI tests and so was the amount of money earnt. 
7.2.2 Patent Application Analysis 
Looking at the combination of patents and a paid licence, a higher PL attribute reduces the 
AST and a AME but increasing the PA attribute increases both factors. With the free license, 
the same effect is observed but with a higher reduction of AST and AME. 
7.2.3 Paid License Analysis 
A combination of PL and FL produced the lowest AST and AME. This is expected as they 
are both cooperative strategies and both aim to reduce the AST with sacrifice to AME. 
7.2.4 Analysis Summary 
Looking at all the analyses, it can be seen that each strategy in combination has a cumulative 
effect. Each simulation showed that when the probability of either strategy is increased, the 
AST and AME increase or decrease according to the how the strategy is affected alone. The 
most noticeable is the combination of patents and free licenses, where patents are highly 
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competitive and free licenses are highly cooperative. Increase the FL reduced the AST and 
AME but increasing the patents increased the AST and AME. 
7.3 Test 3 – Multiple Players 
This test aims to compare each strategy against another strategy. Looking at 2 players, each 
with a single strategy, the simulation will run 100 games and have a Tech Cap of 15. It will 
investigate the number of wins by each player, AST, and AME for each player and strategy. 
Table 3 summarises the number of wins for each strategy in the form of: Player 1 wins | Player 
2 wins. Refer to Appendix 11.3 for the AST and AME results from Test 3.  
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Table 3: Multiple Players Test: Number of Games Won 
 
Player 2 Strategy 
HI PA AQ PL FL JV 
25 50 5 15 10 30 10 50 10 50 25 50 
Player 1 
Strategy 
HI 
25 58|60 85|30 
 50 76|36 54|60 
 
PA 
5 100|0 100|0 51|49 5|95 
 15 100|0 100|0 84|16 42|58 
 
AQ 
10 99|1 100|1 31|69 36|64 69|61 69|48 
 30 96|8 99|1 22|78 30|70 52|68 61|58 
 
PL 
10 100|0 100|0 100|0 88|13 97|3 97|3 70|71 38|94 
 50 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 95|45 65|62 
 
FL 
10 100|0 100|0 59|44 27|73 100|0 100|0 99|2 99|8 57|65 38|85 
 50 100|0 100|0 71|31 31|70 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 90|22 72|76 
 
JV 
25 97|12 94|9 1|100 0|100 59|86 58|62 0|100 0|100 0|100 0|100 31|30|56 6|3|92 
50 90|16 89|14 0|100 0|100 41|90 53|66 0|100 0|100 0|100 0|100 4|10|90 0|0|100 
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7.3.1 Higher Investment Analysis 
When Player 2 had a HI strategy, the most effective strategies to win the game (reach Tech 
Cap) were PA, PL, and FL. These strategies allowed Player 1 to reach Tech Cap before Player 
2 in all 100 repetitions. Notably, acquisition and joint venture both have above a 90% win rate. 
Using the same strategy (HI vs HI) produced near equal win with the same HI probability. It 
should be noted that using a patent strategy increased the AST compared to PL and FL but 
produced significantly higher money for the Player 1 on average, as predicted from the isolation 
test. 
7.3.2 Patent Analysis  
Analysis of the tests against the patent strategy show that reciprocating a patent strategy 
gives roughly a 50% chance of winning, a free license has a slightly higher chance and a paid 
license has the highest chance of winning the game. An acquisition has about a 30% chance of 
winning while appealing for a JV has almost no chance of winning. Against a stronger patent 
attribute, only a paid license has higher than a 50% chance of winning. 
Against a PA strategy, a paid license had the least AST while using a HI strategy had the 
highest. Usually a free license would take the least amount of time but due to the competitive 
nature of a patent, the free license was unable to finish the game quickly. Due to the high AST 
when using a patent (over double the other attributes), the AME of the patent is also quite high, 
whereas PL had the lowest. 
7.3.3 Acquisition Analysis 
The simulations involving an acquisition strategy for Player 2 showed a high win rate (above 
50%) for each strategy except JV. The high win rate from the other strategies is likely due to 
Player 2 being unable to afford to buy Player 1 using an AQ strategy alone, and the low win 
rate of a JV is due to the time and money invested into attempting a JV. Once again, FL has the 
lowest AST and AME and JV has the highest. 
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7.3.3 Paid License Analysis 
Looking at the paid license simulations, there is a very high win rate for the player with a 
strong PL attribute except against a free license. Since a PL and FL don’t affect each other, they 
will race until one player hits the Tech Cap. FL loses money when using this strategy but gains 
more TP while FL loses less money but gains less TP. With the current game balance, the rate 
of TP gain by FL is higher than that of PL. 
7.3.4 Free License Analysis 
The free license strategy is almost unbeatable unless Player 1 has a high patent probability 
or a higher FL attribute. Two players with a FL attribute greatly reduce the AST and both have 
very low AME.  
7.3.5 Joint Venture Analysis 
The joint venture attribute hasn’t had much impact until now, two players with the joint 
venture attribute are able to form and alliance. When both players have 25% chance of forming 
an alliance, there is a 50% chance that the alliance will win the game. When both players have 
a probability of 50, the alliance chance is 100%. Notable results from the JV-JV test show that 
a lower JV probability in both players gives each individual player a higher AME when they 
won and when they both had a higher JV probability, the alliance had a higher AME than the if 
the players won individually. 
7.3.6 Analysis Summary 
Summary of the test analyses show that when each strategy is used against each other, two 
strategies stand out with strong winning rates: patents and free licenses. Both of these strategies 
are strongly supportive of a certain motivation: patents are very competitive and support the 
economic motivation, and free license are very cooperative, supporting the research motivation. 
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7.4 Simulation Nash Equilibrium 
A payoff matrix has been constructed for the strategical options available within the 
simulation. Each Payoff matrix has been created for each potential strategy used by an 
opponent. In each matrix, T represents the current TP of the player and M represents the money.  
7.4.1 General Payoff Matrix 
Table 4 shows the payoff matrix for an opponent using NS. 
Table 4: General Payoff Matrix for NS 
 
Player 2(No Strategy) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP T1+1 T2+1 0 
Money M1-T11.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP T1+1 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T1**1.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP T1+1 
𝑇2
2
+ 1 0 
Money M1-25 M2-T21.5 0 
Acquisition 
TP T1+
𝑇2
2
 0 0 
Money M1 - M2 – 2*T2 2*M2 + 2*T2 0 
Paid 
License 
TP T1+2 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 0.5*T11.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Free 
License 
TP T1+4 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T11.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 0 (T1+T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP T3*
𝑇1
𝑇1+𝑇2
 T3*
𝑇2
𝑇1+𝑇2
 0 
Money M3*
𝑀1
𝑀1+𝑀2
 M3*
𝑀2
𝑀1+𝑀2
 0 
 
The matrix for the remaining strategies can be found in Appendix 11.4. Like in the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, this matrix shows how a player’s resources is affected given the choice of another 
player. If an example initial condition was incorporated, the matrix is easier to comprehend.  
  
Page | 46  
 
7.4.2 Example Payoff Matrix 
For an example matrix, the following values will be used in a two player game: 
• T1 = 4 
• T2 = 6 
• M1 = 30 
• M2 = 19 
Given these condition, the matrix turns into Table 5.  
Table 5: Example Payoff Matrix 
 
Player 2 (No Strategy) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 5 7 0 
Money 22 4.3 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 5 7 0 
Money 12 4.3 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 5 4.5 0 
Money 5 4.3 0 
Acquisition 
TP 7 0 0 
Money -1 50 0 
Paid License 
TP 6 7 0 
Money 26 4.3 0 
Free License 
TP 8 7 0 
Money 18 4.3 0 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 7.2 
Money 0 0 34.4 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
 
From Table 5 it can be seen that if Player 1 had an economic motivation, they would prefer 
to use a paid license to both increase the TP and reduce the amount of money lost. If Player 1 
had a motivation for research, a free license would provide the highest TP. For player 2, if they 
had an economic motivation, being acquired by Player 1 would provide the largest amount of 
money. If Player 2 had a research motivation, they would hope that Player 1 would not use a 
patent or acquisition.  
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Unlike the Prisoners’ Dilemma where each player is assumed to have a similar motivation 
(less jail time) this matrix has 2 possible motivations. A completed matrix with the example 
initial conditions can be found in Appendix 11.5. it should be noted that in this matrix, all 
possible choices are investigated, and if the money amount goes below zero, the option is not 
viable. 
For an economic motivation, the action that provides the most money for each player is if 
they are acquired by the opposing player. Firstly, this is not possible and would lead to an 
infinitely long game as each player would keep buying the other. Secondly, being acquired by 
another player may provide the highest money amount for that moment in the game but once 
bought out, there is very little chance of returning to the game and so, the amount of money 
they receive is likely their final money total. Economically, it would be better to hope the other 
player doesn’t attempt an acquisition as continuing to play would allow continual profits, 
increasing the AME. The strategy that provides the most money and is dependent on the 
player’s decision (not hoping the other will attempt an acquisition) is if both players use a paid 
license. 
For a research orientated motivation, the ideal strategy for both players is if Player 1 uses a 
free license and Player 2 uses a paid license. For Player 2, a free license would actually give 
them more TP but as the player cannot afford to do so, their next best option is a paid license.  
7.4.1 Analysis Summary 
From this analysis, it can be seen that the paid license strategy is the Nash Equilibrium for 
Player 2 regardless of their motivation. For Player 1, their option is dependent on their 
motivation. All of the results from the example matrix are dependent on the TP and money of 
each player at a given time, meaning with each time step, the matrix changes, as does the ideal 
strategy. The matrix also only considers the local time optimal solution, meaning the ideal 
strategy for a given moment in time. If time were considered when choosing a strategy, both 
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players would choose an acquisition as soon as possible. This is because when a player has been 
acquired, they are no longer competition and cannot negatively affect the player’s resources 
and the player can grow freely. Such considerations are essential in Game Theory. 
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8.0 Case Study Simulation 
The validity of the simulation will be tested by attempting to replicate the PC industry case 
study. 
8.1 Case Study Analysis 
8.1.1 Starting Time 
The year of each company’s first computer will serve as the starting time and also the number 
of turns to use in the simulation. Starting from 1976 when apple first released the Apple-I, each 
year will be represented by 10 steps in the program. Table 6 details the starting time and end of 
the simulation. 
Table 6: Starting time for each company and end time for simulation 
Company Year of First PC Release Years from 1976 Step Time Start 
Apple 1976 0 0 
HP 1980 4 40 
IBM 1981 5 50 
Acer 1981 5 50 
Lenovo 1990 14 140 
Dell 1984 8 80 
Present Day (End Simulation) 2017 41 410 
 
7.1.2 Company Strategy 
From the information found in the case study, several indicators were found that will help 
determine the strategy attributes for each company. An example is that Dell and Lenovo both 
acquired other companies within the PC industry, giving them a higher AQ score. Another is 
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the number of patents granted to each company in 2016. Table 7 shows the strategy to be used 
by each player/company in the form of: [HI, PA, AQ, PL, FL, JV]. 
Table 7: Player/Company Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The values used for each strategy were tested and balanced according to attribute weightings 
used in the simulation. Further investigation between a company’s strengths and the game 
attribute will need to be conducted. 
8.2 Simulation Results 
The simulation produced results that has some similarities to the current standings of each 
company. Appendix 11.1 has the Python code required to run the case study simulation. 
Figure 9 shows (a) the result from a single game and (b) the game statistics after 100 repetitions. 
It should be noted that each simulation ran for 410 steps, and since no companies reached the 
Tech Cap within that time, each company has no wins. 
 
 
 
 
Player Number Company Strategy 
1 Apple [12, 20, 5, 30, 10, 5] 
2 HP [20, 15, 2, 10, 20, 1] 
3 IBM [30, 25, 0, 15, 15, 5] 
4 Acer [15, 10, 1, 15, 15, 5] 
5 Lenovo [10, 15, 10, 15, 20, 1] 
6 Dell [10, 10, 7, 15, 10, 5] 
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                            (a)                                                      (b) 
Figure 8: Case study simulation results (a) shows the results for an individual game and (b) shows the results for 100 
repetitions 
8.3 Results Analysis 
From the results of a single game, it can be seen that the distribution for the player TP has 
Player 2 (HP) having the highest Tech Score and Player 3 (IBM) having the lowest. If the 
computer sales for each company is used as an analogy for the tech score, we see that the 
simulation has almost replicated the industry. Table 8 shows a comparison between the Tech 
Score for a single game and the company sales ranking according to Gartner (2017). 
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Table 8: Comparison between the simulation and global sales for a single game 
Comparing these results to the results from the 100 repetition test shows conflicting 
conclusions. Table 9 compares the results from the repeated to the global sales for each 
company  
Table 9: Comparison of data from repeated tests and global sales for each company 
The analogy between the Tech Score in the simulation and the sales of a company is a 
simplified model of the business that assumes that better technology increases sales. Using this 
analogy, the Tech Scores from the single test corresponds to the global sales, but the results 
from the repeated tests are less convincing. 
Player 
Number 
Company 
Simulation (a) Tech 
Score 
Simulation (a) 
Ranking 
Current Global Sales 
Ranking 
1 Apple 5 4
th/5th 4th 
2 HP 10 1
st 1st 
3 IBM 0 6
th 6th 
4 Acer 5 4
th/5th 5th 
5 Lenovo 7 2
nd 2nd 
6 Dell 6 3
rd 3rd 
Player 
Number 
Company 
Simulation (b) Tech 
Score 
Simulation (b) 
Ranking 
Current Global Sales 
Ranking 
1 Apple 9.13 1
st 4th 
2 HP 6.04 5
th 1st 
3 IBM 5.96 6
th 6th 
4 Acer 6.5 4
th 5th 
5 Lenovo 6.96 2
nd 2nd 
6 Dell 6.92 3
rd 3rd 
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In the repeated tests, most simulation rankings are within 1 rank of their global sales ranking. 
Player 1 (Apple) and Player 2 (HP) have a considerable difference from their tech score to their 
sales ranking. The discrepancy between the single test and repeated test is in the nature of the 
strategy choice. Since the choice is based on probability, the conditions in each test can differ 
vastly. The repeated test allows for an average value to provide an estimation of relative 
rankings. It is more likely that the repeated test is a more accurate representation of the 
simulation results as opposed to the single test. Using the results for average total money earnt 
in the repeated tests, the average sum of money obtain in each test is provided. Table 10 shows 
the company’s average total money earnt compared with the market cap. 
Table 10: Comparison between the company market cap and average total money earnt in simulation 
The majority of the comparisons from this data is incorrect except for the representation of 
the money owned by Apple. The discrepancies between the simulation and current standing of 
each company is most likely due to imbalance in the factors governing each strategy. Balancing 
these factors is not within the scope of this project but once completed in future investigations, 
the simulation will be able to recreate the scenarios more accurately. 
  
Player 
Number 
Company 
Simulation (b) Average 
Money Earnt 
Simulation (b) 
Ranking 
Current Market 
Cap ($bn) 
Market Cap 
Ranking 
1 Apple 772.7 1
st 752 1st 
2 HP 474.054 2
nd 29.4 5th 
3 IBM 428.448 3
rd 162.4 2nd 
4 Acer 408.67 4
th 49.53 4th 
5 Lenovo 283.004 6
th 51.10 3rd 
6 Dell 397.716 5
th 13.5 6th 
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9.0 Project Summary 
9.1 Conclusions 
In this investigation, a simulation has been made to determine what strategies are the most 
potentially beneficial for a company in various scenarios. Looking at 2 scenarios; economical 
and research based motivations for a company. A game was created to test these scenarios and 
tests were conducted to balance the game and test each scenario. Once tested, the PC industry 
was used as a case study and the simulation was used to attempt to recreate the current PC 
industry. 
An isolation test was performed to see how a single strategy affects the game. NS, HI, PL, 
and FL were investigated as they did not require an opponent. The best strategy for an 
economically motivated company is to increase investments into research. Although a higher 
investment required more time to complete a game, the money earnings per turn was the highest 
with a HI strategy. For a research motivation, using a free license strategy allowed the player 
to finish the game the fastest, satisfying the research motivation. 
A combination test was conducted to examine the effects of combining each strategy. Once 
again using only 1 player and this time investigating the HI, PA, PL, and FL strategies, the 
effects on AST, and AME are investigated. From this test, it was found that the strategies were 
independent and when used in conjunction, their respective effects were present. For example, 
when a patent and free license strategy were present, a higher FL reduced the AST and AME, 
increasing the patent attribute then increased the AST and AME. When both were increased, 
both the AST and AME decreased but only slightly, due to the higher FL attribute. 
A test involving multiple players was conducted to see how the strategies would compete 
against each other. From this test, it was found that the patent and free license had the highest 
win rates and both strategies were supportive of one motivation type, economical and research 
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respectively. Along with this test, a payoff matrix was constructed to analyse the ideal choices 
for each player. Using an example scenario with given TP and money for each player, the payoff 
matrix was calculated. In the example scenario, the best option for Player 2 was to use a paid 
license regardless of their motivation. For Player 1, the best option was to use a paid license for 
an economic motivation and a free license for a research based motivation. The payoff matrix 
only considered the local time optimal solution and didn’t consider the potentials of acquiring 
a player or using a patent. 
The final simulation conducted was to attempt to recreate the case study. The details 
regarding the PC industry history and 6 popular PC companies were investigated and 
implemented into the strategy. From the results of the simulation, it was found there was slight 
similarities between the case study and the simulation results, but the differences were too 
overwhelming to produce an accurate recreation. The simulation may never be able to perfectly 
recreate the development of an industry due to unforeseeable event that accelerate or destroy 
companies, such as a global financial crisis. 
This simulation will need to be repeated with balanced mechanics in the game and an 
investigation into how a company’s history can be converted into attributes for the simulation, 
will need to be conducted. Both of these are not included in the scope of this investigation.  
9.2 Recommendations 
In this investigation, the objectives were not sucessfully completed. Ideal strategies for 
companies with an economical and research based motivation were found using the simulation 
but upon testing the simulation in the case study, the simulation was found to be inaccurate.  
The game concept and the actions for each strategy are believed to be accurate but the 
strengths of each strategy need to be balanced. To do so, it is recommended that more tests be 
conducted to find the best balance for the game. Once this is completed, an investigation will 
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need to be performed on the case study to find a process of converting the statistics of a 
company into profile for each company to use in the game. The balance of the game mechanics 
will be a factor in the conversion process.  
To improve the reliability of the decision making, a low-level AI is recommended to be 
implemented as a player. The AI would only need to assess the decisions made by other players 
and act according to a predetermined motivation. The payoff matrix can be used as a decision 
guide for the AI as well as a set strategy input. For this AI, to simulate a realistic decision, it 
will need to consider time and the consequences of certain actions. 
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11.0 Appendices 
11.1 Game Simulation Code 
Please read User Guide before running simulation. 
11.1.1 Game Base Code 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Tue Oct 17 23:47:05 2017 
 
@author: Quan 
""" 
import numpy as np 
import random as rdm 
from Strategy_Choice import Strategy_Choice 
from Buyout import Buyout 
from Joint_Venture import Joint_Venture 
from Alliance_Split import Alliance_Split 
np.set_printoptions(threshold=np.nan) 
 
#============================================================================== 
# Game Introduction 
#============================================================================== 
print("GAME START") 
print(" ") 
print("Welcome to the game...") 
print("Use Default settings?") 
print("or play Custom game?") 
print("(0) Default Game") 
print("(1) Custom Game") 
print("(2) Case Study") 
def_strat = int(input())  #input default or custom settings 
 
### Case Study ### 
if def_strat == 2: 
     
    """ 
    Using PC industry as default settings 
    Player 1 = Apple 
    Player 2 = HP 
    Player 3 = IBM 
    Player 4 = Acer 
    Player 5 = Lenovo 
    Player 6 = Dell 
    """ 
     
    NPlayers = 6 
    Tech_Cap = 100 
    Max_Steps = 410 
    Strategy1 = [[12, 20, 5, 30, 10, 5], \ 
                 [20, 15, 2, 10, 20, 1], \ 
                 [30, 25, 0, 15, 15, 5], \ 
                 [15, 10, 1, 15, 15, 5], \ 
                 [10, 15, 10, 15, 20, 1], \ 
                 [10, 10, 7, 15, 10, 5]]  
    Starting_Time = [0, 40, 50, 70, 140, 80] 
     
    print("Number of Players: 6") 
    print("Tech Cap: 100") 
    print("Max Steps:", Max_Steps) 
    for i in range(len(Strategy1)): 
        print("Player", i+1, "Strategy:", Strategy1[i]) 
        print("Player", i+1, "Starting Time:", Starting_Time[i]) 
        print(" ") 
 
### Default Settings 
elif def_strat == 0: 
     
  
    NPlayers = 6 
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    Tech_Cap = 20 
    Max_Steps = 99999 
    Strategy1 = [[20, 10, 5, 10, 10, 5], \ 
                 [10, 20, 5, 10, 10, 5], \ 
                 [10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 5], \ 
                 [10, 10, 5, 20, 10, 5], \ 
                 [10, 10, 5, 10, 20, 5], \ 
                 [10, 10, 5, 10, 10, 50]]  
    Starting_Time = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] 
     
    print("Number of Players: 6") 
    print("Tech Cap: 20") 
    print("Max Steps:", Max_Steps) 
    for i in range(len(Strategy1)): 
        print("Player", i+1, "Strategy:", Strategy1[i]) 
        print("Player", i+1, "Starting Time:", Starting_Time[i]) 
        print(" ") 
 
### Custom Settings ###     
else: 
     
    NPlayers = int(input("Number of Players:")) 
    Tech_Cap = int(input("Tech Cap:")) 
    Max_Steps = int(input("Max Steps:")) 
    Strategy1 = [] 
    Starting_Time = [] 
    print("Strategy Layout") 
    print("[High Investment, Patent Application, Acquisition,\ 
    Paid License, Free License, Joint-Venture]") 
    print("Sum of all attributes must be less than 100") 
    for i in range(NPlayers): 
        HI = int(input("Higher Investment Level:")) 
        print("Remaining:" , 100-HI) 
        Pat = int(input("Patent Application Level:")) 
        print("Remaining:" , 100 - HI+Pat) 
        buy = int(input("Buyout Level:")) 
        print("Remaining:" , 100 - HI+Pat+buy) 
        POS = int(input("Partially Free Open-Source Level:")) 
        print("Remaining:" , 100 - HI+Pat+buy+POS) 
        FOS = int(input("Free Open-Source Level:")) 
        print("Remaining:" , 100 - HI+Pat+buy+POS+FOS) 
        JV = int(input("Joint-Venture Level:")) 
        print("Remaining:" , 100 - HI+Pat+buy+POS+FOS+JV) 
        Strategy1.append([HI, Pat, buy, POS, FOS, JV]) 
        start_time = int(input("Player Starting Time:")) 
        Starting_Time.append(start_time) 
 
 
 
""" 
Player strategy layout 
[[invest more, patent, Buyout, partial open-source,  open source, JV]]  
""" 
 
#============================================================================== 
# Game Factors  
#============================================================================== 
 
Strat_Steps = 10 #how long a player must keep their strategy 
Tech_Cost = 20 
Tech_Factor = 0.1 
Step_Money = 2 
HI = 1.25 #Higher investment factor 
 
alliance_list = [] 
alliance_resources = [] 
 
Tech_Counter_Step = list(np.linspace(0, Max_Steps, (Max_Steps/10)+1)) 
del Tech_Counter_Step[0] 
Tech_Counter_Step = np.array(Tech_Counter_Step) 
 
 
repetitions = int(input("Number of Repetitions:")) 
 
tech_rep = np.zeros(8) 
money_rep =  np.zeros(8) 
Money_Sum = np.zeros(8) 
games_won = [] 
step_rep = [] 
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print("Auto Run?") 
print("(0) Yes") 
print("(1) No") 
 
Auto_Run = int(input()) 
 
 
for reps in range(repetitions):   
 
    Strategy = Strategy1 
    Strat_Choice = np.zeros(NPlayers) 
    Revert_Strategy = np.zeros(NPlayers) #List of when a player can change strategy 
    Player_List = list(np.linspace(1, NPlayers, NPlayers)) 
    Player_List = [int(x) for x in Player_List] 
    Player_List2 = np.copy(Player_List) 
    Tech_Counter = np.zeros(NPlayers) 
    Tech_Counter = [x+1 for x in Tech_Counter] 
    Money_List = np.zeros(NPlayers)   
    alliance_list = [] 
    alliance_resources = [] 
     
    for Steps in range(Max_Steps): #Step Iteration 
        if Auto_Run == 0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            print("Step:", Steps) 
            print(" ") 
        alliance_del = [] #if alliance is deleted, it wont act that turn 
        Player_List2 = np.copy(Player_List) 
        rdm.shuffle(Player_List2) 
        for Player2 in Player_List2: #Player Iteration 
            if (Player2 not in alliance_del) is False: 
                pass 
            else: 
                PI = Player_List.index(Player2) #original player index 
            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                print(" ") 
                print("Player", Player_List[PI], "turn") 
             
            if (Player2 not in alliance_del) is False: 
                pass 
            elif Starting_Time[PI] <= Steps: #Testing if the player has started 
                #Player income added 
                Money_List[PI] = round(Money_List[PI] + Step_Money*\ 
                                      Tech_Counter[PI]*Tech_Factor,2) 
                Money_Sum[PI] += round(Step_Money*Tech_Counter[PI]*Tech_Factor,2) 
                if Money_List[PI] >= money_rep[PI]: 
                    money_rep[PI] = Money_List[PI] 
                ### SRATEGY CHOICE ### 
                if Steps >= Revert_Strategy[PI]: 
                    Strat_Choice[PI] = int(Strategy_Choice(PI, Player_List, \ 
                                        Strategy, Tech_Counter, alliance_list)) 
                    if Strat_Choice[PI] >= 1: 
                        Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps + Strat_Steps 
    #            print(Strat_Choice) 
     
                ### NO STRATEGY ### 
                if Strat_Choice[PI] == 0:  
                    if Tech_Counter[PI] >= 0.0001: 
                        #tech development every ith iteration  
                        if (Steps not in Tech_Counter_Step) is False:  
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Player", Player_List[PI], "No Strategy")  
                            #player cant tech up if doesnt have enough money 
                            if (Money_List[PI] - int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.5)) >= 0:  
                                #deduct tech cost    
                                Money_List[PI] -= int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.5)   
                                if Tech_Counter[PI] == 0: 
                                    pass 
                                else: 
                                    Tech_Counter[PI] += 1 #increase tech 
                            else: 
                                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                    print("Player", Player_List[PI],\ 
                                          "cant afford tech upgrade") 
                                pass 
              
                ### HIGHER INVESTMENT ###             
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                elif Strat_Choice[PI] == 1: 
                    if Tech_Counter[PI] >= 0.0001:   
                        if Auto_Run == 1: 
                            print("Player", Player_List[PI], "is investing more money") 
                        #player cant tech up if doesnt have enough money 
                        if (Money_List[PI] - HI*int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.5)) >= 0:  
                            #deduct tech cost  
                            Money_List[PI] = Money_List[PI] - HI*int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.5)     
                            if Tech_Counter[PI] ==0: 
                                pass 
                            else: 
                                Tech_Counter[PI] += 1 #increase tech 
                                Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                                Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+20 
                        else: 
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Player", Player_List[PI], "cant afford tech upgrade") 
                                Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                            pass 
                     
                ### COPYRIGHT/PATENT ### 
                elif Strat_Choice[PI] == 2: 
                    if Tech_Counter[PI] >= 0.0001: 
                        if Steps <= 25: 
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Too early to obtain patent") 
                            Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                            Revert_Strategy[PI] = 0 
     
                        else: 
                            Patent_Cost = 25 
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Player", Player_List[PI], "attempts copright/patent") 
                            if Money_List[PI] - Patent_Cost >= 0: 
                                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                    print("Player", Player_List[PI],\ 
                                          "acquires copright/patent") 
                                Money_List[PI] = Money_List[PI] - Patent_Cost 
                                for i in range(len(Player_List)): 
                                    if i == PI: 
                                        pass 
                                    else: 
                                        if Tech_Counter[i] >= 5: 
                                            Tech_Counter[i] = int(Tech_Counter[i]/2) 
                                Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                                Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps + 30 
                            else: 
                                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                    print("Player", Player_List[PI],\ 
                                          "cant afford copright/patent") 
                                Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                                Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps + 10 
                                                
                        #tech development every ith iteration                         
                        if (Steps not in Tech_Counter_Step) is False:  
                            #player cant tech up if doesnt have enough money 
                            if (Money_List[PI] - int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.5)) >= 0:  
                                #deduct tech cost 
                                Money_List[PI] -= int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.5)      
                                if Tech_Counter[PI] == 0: 
                                    pass 
                                else: 
                                    Tech_Counter[PI] += 1 #increase tech 
                            else: 
                                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                    print("Player", Player_List[PI], \ 
                                    "cant afford tech upgrade") 
                                pass 
                ### BUYOUT ### 
                elif Strat_Choice[PI] == 3: 
                    if Tech_Counter[PI] >= 0.0001: 
                        if Steps <= 30: 
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Too early to buyout other company") 
                            Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                            Revert_Strategy[PI] = 0 
                        else: 
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Player", Player_List[PI], \ 
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                                      "attempting to buyout another company") 
                            Money_List, Tech_Counter = Buyout(PI, Player_List, \ 
                                                Tech_Counter, Money_List, Auto_Run) 
                            Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                            Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+20 
                 
                ### Partial open source ### 
                elif Strat_Choice[PI] == 4: 
                    if Tech_Counter[PI] >= 0.0001: 
                        Money_List[PI] += 0.2*Step_Money*Tech_Counter[PI]*Tech_Factor 
                        if Auto_Run == 1: 
                            print("Player", Player_List[PI],\ 
                                  "using partial open source strategy") 
                        #tech development every ith iteration  
                        if (Steps not in Tech_Counter_Step) is False:  
                             #player cant tech up if doesnt have enough money 
                            if (Money_List[PI] - int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.4)) >= 0: 
                                #deduct tech cost  
                                Money_List[PI] -= int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.4)     
                                if Tech_Counter[PI] == 0: 
                                    pass 
                                else: 
                                    Tech_Counter[PI] += 2 #increase tech 
                                    Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                                    Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps + 20 
                            else: 
                                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                    print("Player", Player_List[PI], \ 
                                    "cant afford tech upgrade") 
                                    pass 
                    else: 
                        pass 
                ### Full Open Source ### 
                elif Strat_Choice[PI] == 5: 
                    if Tech_Counter[PI] >= 0.0001: 
                        Money_List[PI] -= 0.1*Step_Money*Tech_Counter[PI]*Tech_Factor 
                        if Auto_Run == 1: 
                            print("Player", Player_List[PI], \ 
                            "using full open source strategy") 
                             
                         #tech development every ith iteration  
                        if (Steps not in Tech_Counter_Step) is False: 
                            #player cant tech up if doesnt have enough money 
                            if (Money_List[PI] - int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.4)) >= 0:  
                                #deduct tech cost 
                                Money_List[PI] -= int((Tech_Counter[PI])**1.4)      
                                if Tech_Counter[PI] == 0: 
                                    pass 
                                else: 
                                    Tech_Counter[PI] += 4 #increase tech 
                                    Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                                    Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps + 20 
                            else: 
                                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                    print("Player", Player_List[PI], \ 
                                    "cant afford tech upgrade") 
                                pass 
                    else: 
                        pass 
                ### Joint Venture ### 
                elif Strat_Choice[PI] == 6: 
                    if Tech_Counter[PI] >= 0.0001: 
                        if Steps <= 5: 
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Too early to form an alliance") 
                            Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                            Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+10 
                        else: 
                            if Auto_Run == 1: 
                                print("Player", Player_List[PI], \ 
                                "attempting joint venture") 
                            Player_List, Tech_Counter, \ 
                            Money_List, Strategy, alliance_list, \ 
                            alliance_resources, Starting_Time, Revert_Strategy,\ 
                            Strat_Choice = Joint_Venture\ 
                            (PI, Player_List, Tech_Counter, \ 
                             Money_List, Strategy, alliance_list, \ 
                             alliance_resources, Starting_Time, Steps,\ 
                             Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice, Auto_Run) 
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                elif Strat_Choice[PI] == 7: 
                    if Auto_Run == 1: 
                        print("Player", Player_List[PI], "wants to leave the alliance") 
                    Tech_Counter, Money_List, Player_List, Strategy, Revert_Strategy, \ 
                           Strat_Choice, Starting_Time, alliance_resources, \ 
                           alliance_list , alliance_del = Alliance_Split\ 
                           (PI, Player_List, alliance_list, alliance_resources,\ 
                            Strategy, Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice, Tech_Counter, \ 
                            Money_List, Tech_Cap, Starting_Time, Steps, alliance_del,\ 
                            Auto_Run) 
                      
            else: 
                pass 
        if np.amax(Tech_Counter) >= Tech_Cap: 
            break 
        if Auto_Run == 1: 
            print("Players:", Player_List) 
            print("Tech:", [float("%.2f"% m) for m in Tech_Counter]) 
            print("Money:", [float("%.2f"% m) for m in Money_List]) 
            print("Alliance List", alliance_list) 
 
        if Auto_Run == 0: 
            end = 0 
        else: 
            end = input() 
            if end == '1': 
                break 
         
        
    print(" ") 
    print(" ### ----- Game", reps, "Results ----- ###") 
    for i in range(len(Player_List)): 
        print(" ") 
        print("Player:", Player_List[i]) 
        temp = 1 
        for j in range(len(alliance_list)): #check if player is the alliance 
            if Player_List[i] == alliance_list[j][0]: 
                print("Player", Player_List[i], "is an alliance made from:") 
                for k in range(len(alliance_list[j])): 
                    if k == 0: 
                        pass 
                    else: 
                        print("Player", alliance_list[j][k]) 
                print("Final Alliance Tech Score:", round(Tech_Counter[i],2)) 
                print("Final Alliance Money Count:", round(Money_List[i],2)) 
                temp = 0 
            else: 
                pass             
         
        if int(Tech_Counter[i]) and (Money_List[i]) == 0: #Player is in an alliance 
            print("Player is in an alliance") 
        elif temp == 0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            print("Final Player Tech Score:", round(Tech_Counter[i], 2)) 
            print("Final Player Money Count:", round(Money_List[i],2)) 
    for i in range(len(Player_List)): 
        tech_rep[i] += Tech_Counter[i] 
         
    step_rep.append(Steps)    
     
    for i in range(len(Tech_Counter)): 
        if Tech_Counter[i] >= Tech_Cap: 
            games_won.append(Player_List[i]) 
     
if repetitions >= 2: 
    print(" ") 
    print(" ### ----- GAME STATISTICS ----- ###") 
    print(" ") 
    for i in range(len(tech_rep)): 
        print("Player", i+1) 
        if i <= len(Strategy)-1: 
            print("Player Strategy:", Strategy[i]) 
        print("Average Tech Points:", tech_rep[i]/repetitions) 
        print("Highest Money Amount:", money_rep[i]) 
        print("Total Money Earnt:", Money_Sum[i]/repetitions) 
        win_sum = 0 
        for j in range(len(games_won)): 
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            if i+1 == games_won[j]: 
                win_sum += 1 
        print("Games Won:", win_sum) 
        print(" ") 
    print("Average Number of Steps:", sum(step_rep)/len(step_rep)) 
 
#print(money_rep) 
#print([round(i/repetitions,2) for i in Money_Sum]) 
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11.1.2 Strategy Choice Code 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Wed Oct 18 11:18:53 2017 
 
@author: Quan 
""" 
 
import random as rdm 
import numpy as np 
 
#============================================================================== 
# Strategy Choice 
#============================================================================== 
 
def Strategy_Choice(PI, Player_List, Strategy, Tech_Counter, alliance_list): 
    Strat = Strategy[PI] 
    Strat_Chance = [] 
    for i in alliance_list: 
        for j in i: 
            if j == Player_List[PI] and Tech_Counter[PI] == 0: 
                for i in range(int((100-Strategy[PI][5])/20)): 
                    Strat_Chance.append(7) 
#                print(Strat_Chance) 
                for k in range((100 - len(Strat_Chance))): 
                    Strat_Chance.append(0)   
                return rdm.choice(Strat_Chance) 
            else: 
                pass 
    for strat, chance in enumerate(Strat, 1): 
#        print(Player, strat, chance) 
        if strat == 0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            for j in range(int(chance)): 
                 Strat_Chance.append(strat) 
    for k in range((100 - len(Strat_Chance))): 
        Strat_Chance.append(0) 
    choice = rdm.choice(Strat_Chance) 
#    print(choice) 
    return choice 
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11.1.3 Acquisition Code 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Wed Oct 18 17:18:20 2017 
 
@author: Quant 
""" 
 
import random as rdm 
 
#============================================================================== 
# Acquisition 
#============================================================================== 
 
def Buyout(PI, Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, Auto_Run): 
    buy_chance = [] 
    for i in range(len(Player_List)): 
         
        if i == PI: 
            pass 
        elif Tech_Counter[i] == 0: 
            pass 
        elif Money_List[i] == 0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            potential = int(30/(Money_List[i])) 
            for j in range(potential): 
                buy_chance.append(Player_List[i]) 
    for i in range(len(Player_List)): 
        if i == PI: 
            pass 
        elif Tech_Counter[i] == 0: 
            pass 
        elif Tech_Counter[i] == 1: 
            pass 
        else: 
            potential = int((Tech_Counter[i])/2) 
            for j in range(potential): 
                buy_chance.append(Player_List[i]) 
    if buy_chance == []: 
        return Money_List, Tech_Counter 
     
    buyout_client = rdm.choice(buy_chance)  
    client_index = Player_List.index(buyout_client) 
    if Auto_Run == 1: 
        print("Player", Player_List[PI], "attempting to buy player", buyout_client) 
     
    if Money_List[PI] <= Money_List[client_index] + Tech_Counter[client_index]*2: 
        if Auto_Run == 1: 
            print("Player", Player_List[PI], "cant afford buyout") 
        pass 
    else: 
        Money_List[PI] -=  round(Money_List[client_index] + Tech_Counter[client_index]*2,2) 
        Money_List[client_index] += round(Money_List[client_index] + \  
                                          Tech_Counter[client_index]*2,2) 
                   
        Tech_Counter[PI] += round(int(Tech_Counter[client_index]/2),2) 
        Tech_Counter[client_index] = 0 
        if Auto_Run == 1:             
            print("Player", Player_List[PI], "successfully bought out player", buyout_client) 
    return Money_List, Tech_Counter 
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11.1.4 Joint Venture Code 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Wed Oct 18 22:56:17 2017 
 
@author: Quant 
""" 
 
import numpy as np 
import random as rdm 
 
#============================================================================== 
# Joint Venture  
#============================================================================== 
 
def Joint_Venture(PI, Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, \ 
                  Strategy, alliance_list, alliance_resources, \ 
                  Starting_Time, Steps, Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice, Auto_Run): 
 
    ### CHOOSING POTENTIAL COPANY TO BUY ### 
    potential_alliance = [] 
     
    for i in range(len(Player_List)): 
        if i == PI: 
            pass 
        elif Tech_Counter[i] == 0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            potential = int((Money_List[i])/2) 
            for j in range(potential+1): 
                potential_alliance.append(Player_List[i]) 
    for i in range(len(Player_List)): 
        if i == PI: 
            pass 
        elif Tech_Counter[i] == 0: 
            pass 
        else: 
            potential = int((Tech_Counter[i])/2) 
            for j in range(potential+1): 
                potential_alliance.append(Player_List[i]) 
     
    if potential_alliance == []: #Returns if no potential alliance partner 
        Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+1000 
        Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
        return Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, Strategy, \ 
        alliance_list, alliance_resources, Starting_Time, Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice 
     
    alliance_client = rdm.choice(potential_alliance)  
    client_index = Player_List.index(alliance_client) 
    if Auto_Run == 1: 
        print("Player ", alliance_client, "chosen for alliance") 
    if Player_List[PI] >= 6 and Player_List[client_index] >= 6: 
        return Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, Strategy, \ 
        alliance_list, alliance_resources, Starting_Time, Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice 
    ### TEST IF ALLIANCE IS MUTUAL ### 
    all_prob = int((Strategy[PI][5])*(Strategy[client_index][5])/100) 
#    print(all_prob) 
    all_chance = np.zeros(100) 
    for i in range(all_prob): 
        all_chance[i] = 1 
    alliance = rdm.choice(all_chance) 
     
    if alliance == 0: 
        if Auto_Run == 1: 
            print("Alliance Failed") 
        Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+10 
        Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
        return Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, Strategy, \ 
        alliance_list, alliance_resources, Starting_Time, Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice 
     
     
    else: 
        for i in range(len(alliance_list)): 
            ### PLAYER ALREADY IN ALLIANCE ### 
            if (Player_List[PI] not in alliance_list[i]) is False: 
                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                    print("Initiating player already in alliance") 
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                alliance_player = alliance_list[i][0] 
                alliance_index = Player_List.index(alliance_player) 
                alliance_list[i].append(alliance_client) 
                 
                Tech_Counter[alliance_index] += round(Tech_Counter[client_index]*0.8,2) 
                Money_List[alliance_index] += round(Money_List[client_index]*0.8,2) 
 
                for j in range(len(Strategy[PI])): 
                    strat_sum = 0 
                    for k in range(len(alliance_list[i])): 
                        if alliance_list[i][k] == alliance_player: 
                            pass 
                        else: 
                            temp_ind = Player_List.index(alliance_list[i][k]) 
                            strat_sum += Strategy[temp_ind][j] 
                    Strategy[alliance_index][j] = strat_sum/(len(alliance_list[i])-1) 
             
             
                ### Documenting client alliance contributions 
                for j in range(len(alliance_resources)): 
                    for k in range(len(alliance_resources[j])): 
                        if (alliance_resources[j][k][0] not in\ 
                            alliance_list[i]) is False: 
                            alliance_resources[j].append([alliance_client, \ 
                            Tech_Counter[client_index], Money_List[client_index]]) 
                            break 
                ### Removing client resources ### 
                Tech_Counter[client_index] = 0 
                Money_List[client_index] = 0 
                Revert_Strategy[client_index] = Steps+20 
                Revert_Strategy[client_index] = 0 
                return Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, \ 
                Strategy, alliance_list, alliance_resources, Starting_Time, \ 
                Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice         
                 
                #""" CLIENT ALREADY IN ALLIANCE """ 
            elif (Player_List[client_index] not in alliance_list[i]) is False: 
                if Auto_Run == 1: 
                    print("Player", Player_List[client_index], "already in an alliance") 
                alliance_player = alliance_list[i][0] 
                alliance_index = Player_List.index(alliance_player) 
                alliance_list[i].append(Player_List[PI]) 
                 
                Tech_Counter[alliance_index] += round(Tech_Counter[PI]*0.6,2) 
                Money_List[alliance_index] += round(Money_List[PI]*0.8,2)  
 
                for j in range(len(Strategy[PI])): 
                    strat_sum = 0 
                    for k in range(len(alliance_list[i])): 
                        if alliance_list[i][k] == alliance_player: 
                            pass 
                        else: 
                            temp_ind = Player_List.index(alliance_list[i][k]) 
                            strat_sum += Strategy[temp_ind][j] 
                    Strategy[alliance_index][j] = strat_sum/(len(alliance_list[i])-1) 
             
             
                ### Documenting player alliance contributions 
                for j in range(len(alliance_resources)): 
                    for k in range(len(alliance_resources[j])): 
                        if (alliance_resources[j][k][0] not in\ 
                            alliance_list[i]) is False: 
                            alliance_resources[j].append([Player_List[PI], \ 
                                        Tech_Counter[PI], Money_List[PI]]) 
                            break 
                ### Removing player resources ### 
                Tech_Counter[PI] = 0 
                Money_List[PI] = 0 
                Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+20 
                Revert_Strategy[PI] = 0 
                return Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, \ 
                Strategy, alliance_list, alliance_resources, Starting_Time, \ 
                Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice  
            else: 
                pass 
        ### NEW ALLIANCE ### 
        # Neither player nor client were in any alliance 
        if Auto_Run == 1: 
            print("NEW ALLIANCE FORMED") 
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        alliance_player = Player_List[-1]+1 #New alliance 
         
        alliance_list.append([alliance_player, Player_List[PI], alliance_client]) 
        all_res_temp = [] 
        for i in range(len(alliance_list)): 
            if (alliance_player not in alliance_list[i]) is False: 
                for j in range(len(alliance_list[i])): 
                    if alliance_list[i][j] == alliance_player: 
                        pass 
                    else: 
                        temp_ind = Player_List.index(alliance_list[i][j]) 
                        all_res_temp.append([alliance_list[i][j], \ 
                                Tech_Counter[temp_ind], Money_List[temp_ind]]) 
            else: 
                pass 
        alliance_resources.append(all_res_temp) 
         
        ### ADDING ALLIANCE + RESOURCES TO LISTS ### 
        Player_List.append(alliance_player) 
        Tech_Counter.append(round((Tech_Counter[PI] + Tech_Counter[client_index])*0.8,2))  
        #60% of tech is transferrable 
         
        Money_List = list(Money_List) 
        Money_List.append(round((Money_List[PI] + Money_List[client_index])*0.8,2))  
        #20% fee for merger 
        Money_List = np.array(Money_List) 
         
        Starting_Time.append(Steps) 
        Revert_Strategy = list(Revert_Strategy) 
        Revert_Strategy.append(Steps+20) 
        Revert_Strategy = np.array(Revert_Strategy) 
        Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+30 
        Revert_Strategy[client_index] = Steps + 30 
        Strat_Choice = list(Strat_Choice) 
        Strat_Choice.append(0) 
        Strat_Choicey = np.array(Strat_Choice) 
         
        ### ADDING NEW ALLIANCE STRATEGY ### 
        all_strat = np.zeros(len(Strategy[PI])) 
        for j in range(len(Strategy[PI])): 
            all_strat[j] = (Strategy[PI][j] + Strategy[client_index][j])/2 
         
        Strategy.append(all_strat) 
         
        ### REMOVE RESOURCES FROM INDIVIDUALS ### 
        Tech_Counter[PI] = 0 
        Tech_Counter[client_index] = 0 
        Money_List[PI] = 0 
        Money_List[client_index] = 0 
         
        return Player_List, Tech_Counter, Money_List, Strategy, \ 
        alliance_list, alliance_resources, Starting_Time, Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice 
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11.1.5 Joint Venture Separation 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Sat Oct 21 18:32:43 2017 
 
@author: Quan 
""" 
from numpy import * 
 
#============================================================================== 
# Joint Venture Separation 
#============================================================================== 
 
 
def Alliance_Split(PI, Player_List, alliance_list, alliance_resources, Strategy, \ 
                   Revert_Strategy,Strat_Choice, Tech_Counter, \ 
                   Money_List, Tech_Cap, Starting_Time, Steps, alliance_del, Auto_Run): 
     
    for i in range(len(alliance_list)): 
        if (Player_List[PI] not in alliance_list[i]) is False: 
            alliance_player = alliance_list[i][0] 
            alliance_index = Player_List.index(alliance_player) 
             
    #        print(alliance_player) 
            if len(alliance_list[i]) == 3: 
                if alliance_list[i][1] == Player_List[PI]: 
                    Player1 = copy(alliance_list[i][1]) 
                    Player2 = copy(alliance_list[i][2]) 
                else: 
                    Player1 = copy(alliance_list[i][2]) 
                    Player2 = copy(alliance_list[i][1]) 
                p1_ind = Player_List.index(Player1) 
                p2_ind = Player_List.index(Player2) 
                 
                 
                for j in range(len(alliance_resources)): 
                    for k in range(len(alliance_resources[j])): 
                        if alliance_resources[j][k][0] == Player1: 
                            tech1 = alliance_resources[j][k][1] 
                            money1 = alliance_resources[j][k][2] 
                            temp1 = j 
                        elif alliance_resources[j][k][0] == Player2: 
                            tech2 = alliance_resources[j][k][1] 
                            money2 = alliance_resources[j][k][2] 
                                             
                Tech_Counter[p1_ind] = round(Tech_Counter[alliance_index]*\ 
                            (tech1/(tech1+tech2)),2) 
                Money_List[p1_ind] = round(Money_List[alliance_index]*\ 
                          (money1/(money1+money2)),2) 
                Tech_Counter[p2_ind] = round(Tech_Counter[alliance_index]*\ 
                            (tech2/(tech1+tech2)),2) 
                Money_List[p2_ind] = round(Money_List[alliance_index]*\ 
                          (money2/(money1+money2)),2) 
                 
                Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+20 
                Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
                 
                del alliance_resources[temp1] 
                 
                Revert_Strategy = list(Revert_Strategy) 
                del Revert_Strategy[alliance_index] 
                Revert_Strategy = array(Revert_Strategy) 
                 
                Strat_Choice = list(Strat_Choice) 
                del Strat_Choice[alliance_index] 
                Strat_Choice = array(Strat_Choice) 
                 
                Money_List = list(Money_List) 
                del Money_List[alliance_index] 
                Revert_Strategy = array(Money_List) 
                 
 
                del Player_List[alliance_index] 
                del Tech_Counter[alliance_index] 
                del Starting_Time[alliance_index] 
                alliance_del.append(alliance_player) 
                del Strategy[alliance_index] 
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                del alliance_list[i] 
                return Tech_Counter, Money_List, Player_List, Strategy, \ 
            Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice, Starting_Time, alliance_resources,\ 
            alliance_list , alliance_del 
            else:              
                for j in range(len(alliance_resources)): 
    #                print(j) 
                    for k in range(len(alliance_resources[j])): 
    #                    print(k) 
                        if alliance_resources[j][k][0] == Player_List[PI]: 
                            res_index1 = j 
                            res_index2 = k 
                            break 
                        else: 
                            pass 
                tech_sum = 0 
                money_sum = 0 
                for j in range(len(alliance_resources[res_index1])): 
    #                print(j) 
                    tech_sum += alliance_resources[res_index1][j][1] 
                    money_sum += alliance_resources[res_index1][j][2] 
                    if alliance_resources[res_index1][j][0] == Player_List[PI]: 
                        Player_tech = alliance_resources[res_index1][j][1] 
                        Player_money = alliance_resources[res_index1][j][2] 
    #                    del alliance_resources[all_index1][j] 
                    else: 
                        pass 
                 
                Tech_Counter[PI] = round(Player_tech*Tech_Counter[alliance_index]/tech_sum,2) 
                Money_List[PI] = round(Player_money*Money_List[alliance_index]/money_sum,2) 
                           
                Tech_Counter[alliance_index] -= Tech_Counter[PI] 
                Money_List[alliance_index] -= Money_List[PI] 
                 
                Revert_Strategy[PI] = Steps+20 
                Strat_Choice[PI] = 0 
     
                for j in range(len(Strategy[PI])): 
                    Strategy[alliance_index][j] = ((Strategy[alliance_index][j]*\ 
                            (len(alliance_list[i])-1)) - Strategy[PI][j])/\ 
                            ((len(alliance_list[i])) - 2) 
     
                for j in range(len(alliance_list[i])): 
                    if alliance_list[i][j] == Player_List[PI]: 
                        Del = j 
                 
                del alliance_resources[res_index1][res_index2] 
                del alliance_list[i][Del] 
                return Tech_Counter, Money_List, Player_List, Strategy, \ 
            Revert_Strategy, Strat_Choice, Starting_Time, alliance_resources,\ 
            alliance_list, alliance_del 
        else: 
            pass 
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11.2 Game Simulation User Guide 
Technology Strategy as a Partially Adversarial Game 
 
Table of Contents 
(1) Introduction 
(2) System Requirements 
(3) Installation Guide 
(4) How To Play 
(5) Strategy Breakdown 
(6) Troubleshooting 
(7) Contact Details 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing company needs a strong strategy to ensure success and allow 
for growth.  
The strategies used for technological development are vital to the 
infrastructure  
and growth of a company, but when other competitive companies become 
threats, there  
is wide debate on the recommended actions of the growing company. 
Competing and  
cooperating with competitive companies both have pros and cons, but one 
must be  
better than the other in specific scenarios.  
 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
(2) SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
 
-Spyder Interface running Python 3.6 or later 
-Keyboard 
-Mouse 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
(3) INSTALLATION GUIDE 
 
Unzip game file 
Run the Game.py file in Spyder 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
(4) HOW TO PLAY 
 
A) Choose to play default or custom settings 
 
Custom Settings: 
Choose Number of Players 
Choose Tech Cap 
Choose Player Strategy (HI, PA, AQ, PL, FL, JV) 
Choose Starting Time 
 
B) Choose Auto Run 
 
C) Press Enter to Run through program if Auto Run is 
   disabled 
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D) Press 1 then Enter to stop the simulation 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
(5) STRATEGY BREAKDOWN 
 
NS - No Strategy 
Player doesnt act. if it is a tech upgrade turn, player 
will buy a TP 
 
HI - Higher Investment 
Player will spend more money to instantly buy a TP. 
Recharge after 10 turns 
 
PA - Patent 
Player will spend money to buy a patent. patent will  
reduce the TP of every other player. 
Recharge after 20 turns 
 
AQ - Acquisition 
Player will attempt to buyout another player. if successful,  
the acquirer will gain some of the target's TP. Target  
will gain 100% of the purchase cost. 
 
PL - Paid License 
Player will release a paid license, allowing others 
to buy the product and provide feedback. Increases 
TP and reduce money cost. 
 
FL - Free License 
Player will release a free license, allowing others 
to buy the product for free and provide feedback. 
Increases TP greatly at higher cost. 
 
JV - Joint Venture 
Enter a joint venture with another player. Choice of player 
is based on TP and money, and chosen at random. The chosen 
player has an option to decline the invitation. If accepted, 
both players join together and create a new player. TP 
and money will be combined with small losses 
 
JVS _ Joint Venture Separation 
Once in the joint venture, either player is able to  
leave the JV when desired. If a player leaves, they will  
take their fraction of resources from the alliance. The 
alliance will hold if there are at least 2 remaining 
players. Otherwise the alliance will be disbanded and  
the resources distributed accordingly 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
(6) TROUBLESHOOTING 
 
if problems occur in the code, try closing and re-running 
the program. if problems persists, check player strategies 
and make sure the total is less than 100.  
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
(7) CONTACT DETAILS 
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Contact Quan Tran at: 
quan.tran2@uqconnect.edu.au 
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11.3 Multiple Player Test Results 
11.3.1 Number of Games Won 
Table 11: Multiple Player Test: Number of Games Won 
 
Player 2 Strategy 
HI PA AQ PL FL JV 
25 50 5 15 10 30 10 50 10 50 25 50 
Player 1 
Strategy 
HI 
25 58|60 85|30 
 50 76|36 54|60 
 
PA 
5 100|0 100|0 51|49 5|95 
 15 100|0 100|0 84|16 42|58 
 
AQ 
10 99|1 100|1 31|69 36|64 69|61 69|48 
 30 96|8 99|1 22|78 30|70 52|68 61|58 
 
PL 
10 100|0 100|0 100|0 88|13 97|3 97|3 70|71 38|94 
 50 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 95|45 65|62 
 
FL 
10 100|0 100|0 59|44 27|73 100|0 100|0 99|2 99|8 57|65 38|85 
 50 100|0 100|0 71|31 31|70 100|0 100|0 100|0 100|0 90|22 72|76 
 
JV 
25 97|12 94|9 1|100 0|100 59|86 58|62 0|100 0|100 0|100 0|100 31|30|56 6|3|92 
50 90|16 89|14 0|100 0|100 41|90 53|66 0|100 0|100 0|100 0|100 4|10|90 0|0|100 
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11.3.2 Average Steps Taken 
Table 12: Multiple Player Test: Average Steps Taken 
 
Player 2 Strategy 
HI PA AQ PL FL JV 
25 50 5 15 10 30 10 50 10 50 25 50 
Player 1 
Strategy 
HI 
25 209.38 210.31 
 50 210.39 212.29 
 
PA 
5 220.5 218.2 486.7 569.4 
 15 237 236.8 614.8 624.4 
 
AQ 
10 174.3 173.98 212.27 227.6 176.85 175.46 
 30 179.49 172.48 214.94 232.83 176.22 178.71 
 
PL 
10 132.2 131.3 95.2 119.7 133.5 131.8 128 119.9 
 50 119.9 121.7 76.1 79.7 119.2 119.7 121.1 115.6 
 
FL 
10 87.2 91.7 183.6 212.4 87 87 87.3 87.5 80 72.8 
 50 73.6 74.4 166.5 209.4 74.9 74.7 73.9 74.6 73.8 71.8 
 
JV 
25 197.91 198.93 220.5 235.9 187.76 185.09 133 118.7 90.5 75 218.97 249.79 
50 197.86 198.85 238 236.8 185.69 185.59 131 120.4 88.3 73.8 246.46 483.81 
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11.3.3 Average Money Earnt 
Table 13: Multiple Player Test: Average Money Earnt (rounded to the nearest dollar) 
 
Player 2 Strategy 
HI PA AQ PL FL JV 
25 50 5 15 10 30 10 50 10 50 25 50 
Player 1 
Strategy 
HI 
25 359|359 362|358 
 50 358|361 363|363 
 
PA 
5 385|285 380|283 755|751 721|957 
 15 420|271 419|271 1013|807 878|917 
 
AQ 
10 271|246 270|252 300|301 289|319 269|265 268|248 
 30 277|249 262|228 281|330 281|341 251|267 268|264 
 
PL 
10 214|166 213|162 150|99 195|152 213|167 216|154 203|203 183|192 
 50 193|140 197|143 112|65 119|72 191|136 193|130 194|186 180|181 
 
FL 
10 133|84 144|90 294|292 312|358 136|79 135|71 135|105 134|112 115|116 102|108 
 50 107|61 110|62 272|250 324|352 108|60 109|54 107|77 110|81 104|99 102|102 
 
JV 
25 326|325 328|327 276|385 260|418 297|303 289|284 165|218 134|190 86|144 60|111 256|257|50 181|174|108 
50 322|327 327|326 255|422 250|419 274|300 277|286 155|213 135|195 78|138 56|109 171|178|114 118|120|346 
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11.4 Simulation Payoff Matrix 
11.4.1 No Strategy 
Table 14: General Payoff Matrix for NS 
 
Player 2(No Strategy) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP T1+1 T2+1 0 
Money M1-T11.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP T1+1 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T1**1.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP T1+1 
𝑇2
2
+ 1 0 
Money M1-25 M2-T21.5 0 
Acquisition 
TP T1+
𝑇2
2
 0 0 
Money M1 - M2 – 2*T2 2*M2 + 2*T2 0 
Paid 
License 
TP T1+2 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 0.5*T11.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Free 
License 
TP T1+4 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T11.5 M2-T21.5 0 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 0 (T1+T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP T3*
𝑇1
𝑇1+𝑇2
 T3*
𝑇2
𝑇1+𝑇2
 0 
Money M3*
𝑀1
𝑀1+𝑀2
 M3*
𝑀2
𝑀1+𝑀2
 0 
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11.4.2 Higher Investments 
Table 15: General Payoff Matrix for HI 
 
Player 2(Higher Investment) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP T1 +1 T2+2 0 
Money M1 - T1 1.5 M2-2.5 * T21.5 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP T1 +1 T2+2 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T11.5 M2-2.5 * T21.5 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP T1+1 
𝑇2
2
 +2 0 
Money M1-25 M2-2.5 * T21.5 0 
Acquisition 
TP T1+ 
𝑇2
2
 0 0 
Money M1 – M2 – 2*T2 2*M2 + 2*T2 0 
Paid 
License 
TP T1+2 T2+2 0 
Money M1 - 0.5*T11.5 M2-2.5 * T21.5 0 
Free 
License 
TP T1+4 T2+2 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T11.5 M2-2.5 * T21.5 0 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP T3*
𝑇1
𝑇1+𝑇2
 T3*
𝑇2
𝑇1+𝑇2
 0 
Money M3*
𝑀1
𝑀1+𝑀2
 M3*
𝑀2
𝑀1+𝑀2
 0 
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11.4.3 Patents 
Table 16: General payoff Matrix for PA 
 
Player 2(Patents) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 
𝑇1
2
 +1 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - T1 1.5 M2-25 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 
𝑇1
2
  +1 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T11.5 M2-25 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 
𝑇1
2
 +1 
𝑇2
2
 +1 0 
Money M1-25 M2-25 0 
Acquisition 
TP 
𝑇1
2
+ 
𝑇2
2
 0 0 
Money M1 – M2 – 2*T2 2*M2 + 2*T2 0 
Paid 
License 
TP 
𝑇1
2
 +2 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 0.5*T11.5 M2-25 0 
Free 
License 
TP 
𝑇1
2
 +4 T2+1 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T11.5 M2-25 0 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP T3*
𝑇1
𝑇1+𝑇2
 T3*
𝑇2
𝑇1+𝑇2
 0 
Money M3*
𝑀1
𝑀1+𝑀2
 M3*
𝑀2
𝑀1+𝑀2
 0 
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11.4.4 Acquisition 
Table 17: General Payoff Matrix for AQ 
 
Player 2(Acquisition) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No 
Strategy 
TP 0 T2 + 
𝑇1
2
 0 
Money 2*M1 + 2*T1 M2-25 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 0 T2 + 
𝑇1
2
 0 
Money 2*M1 + 2*T1 M2-25 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 0 T2 + 
𝑇1
2
 0 
Money 2*M1 + 2*T1 M2-25 0 
Acquisition 
TP - - 0 
Money - - 0 
Paid 
License 
TP 0 T2 + 
𝑇1
2
 0 
Money 2*M1 + 2*T1 M2-25 0 
Free 
License 
TP 0 T2+ 
𝑇1
2
 0 
Money 2*M1 + 2*T1 M2-25 0 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 T3 0 
Money 0 M3 0 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP 0 T3 0 
Money 0 M3 0 
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11.4.5 Paid License 
Table 18: General Payoff Matrix for PL 
 
Player 2(Paid License) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP T1 + 1 T2 + 2 0 
Money M1 - T11.5 M2 - 0.5*T21.5 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP T1 + 1 T2 + 2 0 
Money M1 – 1.5*T11.5 M2 - 0.5*T21.5 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP T1 + 1 
𝑇2
2
 + 2 0 
Money M1 - 25 M2 - 0.5*T21.5 0 
Acquisition 
TP T1 + 
𝑇2
2
 0 0 
Money M1 – M2 – 2*T1 2*M2 + 2*T1 0 
Paid 
License 
TP T1 + 2 T2 + 2 0 
Money M1 - 0.5*T11.5 M2 - 0.5*T21.5 0 
Free 
License 
TP T1 + 4 T2+2 0 
Money 2*M1 + 2*T1 M2 - 0.5*T21.5 0 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP T3*
𝑇1
𝑇1+𝑇2
 T3*
𝑇2
𝑇1+𝑇2
 0 
Money M3*
𝑀1
𝑀1+𝑀2
 M3*
𝑀2
𝑀1+𝑀2
 0 
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11.4.6 Free License 
Table 19: General Payoff Matrix for FL 
 
Player 2(Free License) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP T1 + 1 T2 + 4 0 
Money M1 - T11.5 M2 - 1.5*T21.5 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP T1 + 1 T2 + 4 0 
Money M1 – 1.5*T11.5 M2 - 1.5*T21.5 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP T1 + 1 
𝑇2
2
 + 4 0 
Money M1 - 25 M2 - 1.5*T21.5 0 
Acquisition 
TP T1 + 
𝑇2
2
 0 0 
Money M1 – M2 – 2*T1 2*M2 + 2*T1 0 
Paid 
License 
TP T1 + 2 T2 + 4 0 
Money M1 - 0.5*T11.5 M2 - 1.5*T21.5 0 
Free 
License 
TP T1 + 4 T2+4 0 
Money M1 - 1.5*T11.5 M2 - 1.5*T21.5 0 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP T3*
𝑇1
𝑇1+𝑇2
 T3*
𝑇2
𝑇1+𝑇2
 0 
Money M3*
𝑀1
𝑀1+𝑀2
 M3*
𝑀2
𝑀1+𝑀2
 0 
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11.4.7 Joint Venture 
  Table 20: General Payoff Matric for JV 
 
Player 2(Joint Venture) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Patent 
Application 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Acquisition 
TP T3 0 0 
Money M3 0 0 
Paid 
License 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Free 
License 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
TP 0 0 (T1+ T2)*0.8 
Money 0 0 (M1+M2)*0.8 
Joint 
Venture 
Separation 
TP T3*
𝑇1
𝑇1+𝑇2
 T3*
𝑇2
𝑇1+𝑇2
 0 
Money M3*
𝑀1
𝑀1+𝑀2
 M3*
𝑀2
𝑀1+𝑀2
 0 
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11.5 Example Payoff Matrix 
11.5.1 No Strategy 
          Table 21: Example Payoff Matrix for NS 
 
Player 2 (No Strategy) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 5 7 0 
Money 22 4.3 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 5 7 0 
Money 12 4.3 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 5 4.5 0 
Money 5 4.3 0 
Acquisition 
TP 7 0 0 
Money -1 50 0 
Paid License 
TP 6 7 0 
Money 26 4.3 0 
Free License 
TP 8 7 0 
Money 18 4.3 0 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 7.2 
Money 0 0 34.4 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
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11.5.2 Higher Investments 
     Table 22: Example Payoff Matrix for HI 
 
Player 2 (Higher Investment) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 5 7 0 
Money 22 -3.045 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 5 7 0 
Money 12 -3.045 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 5 4 0 
Money 5 -3.045 0 
Acquisition 
TP 7 0 0 
Money -1 50 0 
Paid License 
TP 6 7 0 
Money 26 -3.045 0 
Free License 
TP 8 7 0 
Money 18 -3.045 0 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
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11.5.3 Patents 
           Table 23: Example Payoff Matrix for Patents 
 
Player 2 (Patent) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 3 7 0 
Money 22 -6 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 3 7 0 
Money 12 -6 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 3 4 0 
Money 5 -6 0 
Acquisition 
TP 7 0 0 
Money -1 50 0 
Paid License 
TP 4 7 0 
Money 26 -6 0 
Free License 
TP 6 7 0 
Money 18 -6 0 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
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11.5.4 Acquisition 
        Table 24: Example Payoff Matrix for AQ 
 
Player 2 (Acquisition) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 0 8 0 
Money 68 -19 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 0 8 0 
Money 68 -19 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 0 8 0 
Money 68 -19 0 
Acquisition 
TP - - 0 
Money - - 0 
Paid License 
TP 0 8 0 
Money 68 -19 0 
Free License 
TP 0 8 0 
Money 68 -19 0 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
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11.5.5 Paid License 
     Table 25: Example Payoff Matrix for PL 
 
Player 2 (Paid License) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 5 8 0 
Money 22 11.652 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 5 8 0 
Money 12 11.652 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 5 5 0 
Money 5 11.652 0 
Acquisition 
TP 7 0 0 
Money -1 50 0 
Paid License 
TP 6 8 0 
Money 26 11.652 0 
Free License 
TP 8 8 0 
Money 18 11.652 0 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
 
  
Page | 93  
 
11.5.6 Free License 
      Table 26: Example Payoff Matrix for FL 
 
Player 2 (Free License) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 5 10 0 
Money 22 -3.045 0 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 5 10 0 
Money 12 -3.045 0 
Patent 
Application 
TP 5 7 0 
Money 5 -3.045 0 
Acquisition 
TP 7 0 0 
Money -1 50 0 
Paid License 
TP 6 10 0 
Money 26 -3.045 0 
Free License 
TP 8 10 0 
Money 18 -3.045 0 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
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11.5.7 Joint Venture 
     Table 27: Example Payoff Matrix for JV 
 
Player 2 (Joint Venture) 
Player 1 Player 2 Alliance 
Player 
1 
No Strategy 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Higher 
Investment 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Patent 
Application 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Acquisition 
TP 8 0 0 
Money 39.2 0 0 
Paid License 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Free License 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Joint Venture 
TP 0 0 8 
Money 0 0 39.2 
Joint Venture 
Separation 
TP 3.2 4.8 0 
Money 24 15.2 0 
 
 
